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SUING IN THE RIGHT OF THE
CORPORATION: A COMMENTARY
AND PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE
REFORM
Lawrence A. Larose*
The shareholder suit is the subject of divergent opinions
among laymen, attorneys, and the courts. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has variously described it as "the
chief regulator of corporate management,"' and as the principal
source of "vexatious litigation."2
If the duties of care and loyalty that managers owe to their
corporations 3 could be enforced only by the corporation itself,
many wrongs would never be remedied. Where a majority of the
corporation's shareholders benefit by the manager's breach of
duty, they will normally continue to elect either the same managers or others who can be relied upon not to initiate litigation
designed to remedy the wrong. Even where a majority of shareholders do not benefit by wrongdoing, in publicly held corporations the difficulty of organizing shareholders to oust the wrongdoers from office, and elect new directors who will bring suit
against their predecessors, is often insuperable.4 From its incep*

Member, New York Bar. B.A., 1980, Tufts University; J.D., 1983, Georgetown Uni-

versity Law Center.
1. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1974).
3. Because corporate directors and officers occupy a fiduciary position, they must exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions touching their duties to the corporation
and its property. In their dealings with and for the corporation, they are held to the
same strict rule of honesty and fair dealing between themselves and their principals as
other agents. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See also Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472
F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (directors and officers must manage the corporate affairs in
good faith, within the limits of applicable law, and give the corporate entity the benefit
of their best business judgment and care). But see Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 288 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (responsibility of directors requires fairness, reasonable judgment, and absence of fraud; it does not require "spoon feeding"), rev.'d, 415
F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally M. FEUER, PERSONAL LIan.rrIEs oi' CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTOSS 28-42 (2d ed. 1974); Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities
and Liabilities, Bus. LAW., Feb. 1972, at 1.
4. Proxy contests raise intricate questions of both federal and state law, See 1 G.
HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 355 (1959); Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules
and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1249 (1960).
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tion in Dodge v. Woolsey,5 the derivative right of action has
been utilized as a means by which individual shareholders may
obtain redress for a managerial breach of trust. In our modern
corporate society, the need for a method of policing the internal
affairs of corporations has never been more acute. With the ever
widening separation of corporate ownership and control first
noted in 1932 by Professors Berle and Means' and the increased
autonomy conferred upon officers and directors by modern corporation codes,7 decisionmaking has, of necessity, become ever
more centralized within corporate management. It is reasonable
to assume that the ordinary shareholder in a modern public corporation purchases shares for the economic return he expects to
realize, not for the chance to participate in the corporation's
governance. 8 An investor's ability to "vote with his money" is,
however, an insufficient remedy for those investors whose justified expectations have been subverted by management misdeeds.
It is therefore imperative to develop a sound public policy by
which persons exercising decisional power can be held accountable for its use.
The central problem presented by the derivative action is its
dual character-it is at once substantive and procedural. The
substantive nature of the action is reflected in the type of claims
5. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). In Dodge, the Supreme Court held that where the
directors of a bank refused to take measures to resist the collection of a tax that the
directors believed to be unconstitutional, the refusal amounted to a breach of trust that
could be remedied by a shareholder derivative action.
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) (business and affairs of corporation
to be managed by or under direction of board of directors); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (business of corporation shall be managed by board of directors); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.05 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (same); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
717 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (standard of care for director conduct); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 8.65 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (good faith of director as allowable defense).
8. See Werner, CorporationLaw In Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611,
1643 (1981) (arguing that separation of ownership and control was inherent in the earliest corporations and persists today as corporations pursue profitability and shareholders
pursue private gain).
9. See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 81 (1967).
Although accountability can be a vague and far-reaching concept, the Commentary to
this Article's proposed Statute uses the term in a very narrow sense. The accountability
intended to be enforced by derivative action is not against honest though ill-fated corporate decisionmakers. Market forces will undoubtedly hold such decisionmakers accountable in those instances. Where market forces are insufficient or inadequate to adjust equitably for violations of fiduciary duty or negligence, however, derivative actions are a
useful means by which corporate decisionmakers may be held accountable for misuse of
power. In this regard, the decisionmaker against whom the action is brought may be a
director or officer of the corporation or a major shareholder who, because of the disproportionate influence conferred through ownership of a large percentage of the corporation's outstanding stock, is in a position to control corporate affairs.
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that can be asserted derivatively, 10 and its procedural nature is
reflected in the numerous restraints that plaintiffs face when asserting such claims.1" This dichotomy is perpetuated by state
law which, for the most part, regulates the procedural aspects of
the action by statute while leaving substantive issues to courts
12
acting under the broad guidance of common law.
Such a schizophrenic scheme inevitably has its limitations. Although the case-by-case analysis of courts is uniquely suited to
the discovery and balancing of competing interests on the facts
of particular situations, it is less competent in developing predictable procedures for the analysis of recurring problems. The
case law relating to the contemporaneous ownership requirement, 3 the demand requirement,1 " and the competency of a
board of directors to seek dismissal of a derivative action15 has
produced an unsettled patchwork of procedural and substantive
considerations that often fails to adhere to consistent underlying
principles 6 and, more importantly, fails to provide a workable
framework for balancing the public interest in management accountability and the corporate interest in avoiding frivolous litigation. This Article argues that the judiciary is unlikely to
achieve such a principled balance from the vague and often inconsistent standards of the common law. Given the central role
of the derivative action in the enforcement of corporate law and
the vital public policy issues that it inevitably raises, a comprehensive legislative solution is necessary.
Although this Article is not the first to propose a legislative
approach, it differs from other efforts by proposing a comprehensive statutory scheme supported by analytical commentary.
Recent developments in case law17 and proposals for reform em10. See infra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 89-114 (the contemporaneous ownership rule), note 145 (the demand requirement), and notes 230-43 and accompanying text (security-for-expenses
requirements).
12. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1; COLO. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
13. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 122-77 and accompanying text.
16. Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) and Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (judicial examination of board of directors' decision to dismiss derivative action on recommendation of committee of independent directors limited to examination of independence and good faith of committee),
with Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) and Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880 (-2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (in examining board of directors'
decision to dismiss derivative action on recommendation of committee of independent
directors, court may exercise "business judgment").
17. See infra notes 134-58 and accompanying text.
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anating from authoritative groups in the legal community 18 suggest that an in-depth analysis of the derivative action is particularly timely.
This Article is premised on the belief that the derivative action is uniquely susceptible to strike suit litigation-that is, actions with little or no substantive merit but pursued to exploit
the nuisance value inherent in litigation. Although there is historic support for the notion of "pernicious and vexing" derivative litigation,19 some modern evidence suggests that the vast
majority of publicly held companies experience no derivative litigation.2 0 Commentators, however, have questioned both the validity of the modern evidence and the conclusions derived from
it.2 ' Despite these criticisms, observers of the present vitality of
the derivative action, far from characterizing it as an effective
litigation technique, opine that the action may face "extinction. '2 2 Because recent decisions such as Burks v. Lasker,23
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,2 and Auerbach v. Bennett 25 have
witnessed courts deferring to board decisions to terminate ongoing derivative actions on the grounds that the actions were not
in the corporation's best interest, commentators suggest that directors may now possess a veto power over derivative claims.26
In such a climate, "[tihe strike suit . . . may very well be no
more than an over-the-hill dragon, puffed into life to frighten
18.
19.

See infra notes 21, 62 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Note, Extortionate CorporateLitigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 1308 (1934). The Note persuasively demonstrates that the fear of strike suits is not
academic:
The characteristics of strike suits may be illustrated by the activities of Clarence
H. Venner, referred to as "an artificer of litigation and a menace to corporate
society." During his career he conducted at least 23 campaigns against [numerous corporations]. These campaigns involved at least 40 separate actions and
have left over 100 cases in the reports. The campaign against the New York
Central extended over 14 years, involved 12 suits in 4 jurisdictions, employed 4
nominal plaintiffs, left 29 cases in the reports, and reached the United States
Supreme Court 5 times.
Id. at 1308 n.1.
20. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REv. 306, 312-13 (1980).
21. See American Law Institute, Code of Corporate Governance 229-32 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as ALI Code].
22. Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 261, 261 (1981). See also Note, Off
the Bench and Into the Boardroom:Judicial Business Judgment after Zapata, 70 GEo.
L.J. 1025 (1982).
23. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
24. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
25. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
26. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 262.
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the courts away from deciding substantive issues.""
The ideal derivative suit statute would balance precisely the
public concern for management accountability and the corporation's concern in avoiding frivolous and unfounded claims, while
maintaining the derivative action as a viable method of enforcing accountability in the modern corporation. The Statute2 8 and
Commentary 9 proposed in this Article attempt to articulate
such a balanced vision. The guiding force behind the myriad
policy choices required by such an undertaking is the desire to
maintain the derivative action as a viable legal institution available for protection of shareholder rights.
I.

STATUTORY PROPOSAL

SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
(a)

(b)

(c)
(d)

"Direct Action" means a cause of action
brought to assert rights and enforce duties
belonging or owed to a holder of any equity
interest in a Corporation individually, and
may be brought on the holder's own behalf
or on behalf of a class of similarly situated
holders. A Direct Action also means a cause
of action brought to assert rights and enforce duties belonging or owed to a Corporation and brought by the Corporation on
its own behalf.
"Derivative Action" means a cause of action brought to assert rights and enforce
duties belonging to or owed to a Corporation and may be brought on the Corporation's behalf as provided in this Title.
"Corporation" includes professional corporations and not-for-profit corporations.
"Qualified Interest" means:
(i)
the interest of a person identified as a
shareholder of record of the Corpora-

27. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 888 (5th ed. unabridged 1980).
28. Part I of this Article presents a Statute to govern derivative actions initiated
under state law.
29. Part II of this Article is a commentary that explains the Statute Part I proposes.
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tion without regard to class, designa-

(e)

(f)

tion, or preference, provided that a
group of persons identified as co-owners or co-fiduciaries shall each possess a Qualified Interest as defined in
this subsection;
(ii)
the interest of a beneficial owner of
shares of any class of stock of the
Corporation held by a nominee, trustee, or any other fiduciary, unless the
governing instrument under which
such nominee, trustee, or other fiduciary holds such stock expressly denies
the beneficiary the power to commence a Derivative Action, provided
that in the case of any beneficial interest held collectively or jointly by ten
or more persons, the Corporation has
actual knowledge, prior to the time of
the transactions alleged in the complaint, of the identity of all beneficial
owners collectively or jointly holding
the interest;
(iii) the interest of a person holding an unsecured debt instrument issued by the
Corporation that is convertible or exchangeable immediately or at a future
date, with or without consideration,
into shares of any class of the Corporation's stock, or carrying a warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase
shares of any class of the Corporation's stock.
"Due care violation" means a violation of a
statutory duty of due care owed by an individual to the Corporation.
"Associate" of a person includes:
(i)
any corporation or other organization
of which such person is an officer or
partner or is, directly or indirectly,
the beneficial owner of fifty percent or
more of any class of equity securities;
(ii)
any trust or other estate in which
such person has a substantial benefi-
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cial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a similar
capacity;
(iii) any parent, child, or spouse of such
person (other than a spouse legally
separated under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance) including
parents and children of such person's
spouse.
"Close Corporation" means a corporation
that:
(i)
has 35 or fewer record holders of its
equity securities;
(ii)
has $3 million or less in total assets;
and
(iii) has never undertaken an offering of
its securities requiring registration
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, or state law.
SECTION 2: CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIONS

(a)

(b)

An action shall be classified as a Derivative
Action if alleged damage to a Qualified Interest in the Corporation is attributable to
injury to the Corporation itself. An action
shall be classified as a Direct Action if alleged damage to a Qualified Interest is attributable to injury to the holder.
If a transaction properly gives rise to both
Direct and Derivative Actions, a holder of a
Qualified Interest may commence and
maintain such actions contemporaneously,
and the restrictions and provisions of this
Title pertaining to Derivative Actions shall
not apply to any claims arising from the
transaction.
SECTION 3: STANDING

To have standing to commence and maintain a Derivative Action, plaintiff must allege in the complaint and
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence at trial that:
(a)
plaintiff is the holder of a Qualified Interest, and is capable of fully and fairly representing the class of persons injured by the
transaction complained of; and
(b) unless plaintiff is the holder of a Qualified
Interest in a Close Corporation, that plaintiff either:
(i)
acquired the Qualified Interest before
disclosure, either to the public generally, as evidenced by the market price
of the Qualified Interest, or to plaintiff
personally, as evidenced by the purchase price of the Qualified Interest,
of the wrongdoing of which plaintiff
complains; or
(ii)
acquired the Qualified Interest by
devolution of law from a person who
acquired the Qualified Interest before
disclosure, either to the public generally, as evidenced by the market price
of the Qualified Interest, or to said
person personally, as evidenced by
the purchase price of the Qualified Interest, of the wrongdoing of which
plaintiff complains; and
(c)
the Qualified Interest required under subsection (a) was continuously held by the
plaintiff or a predecessor in interest from
the time of disclosure of the wrong complained of until the conclusion of the action.
SECTION 4: DEMAND AND DISMISSAL
(a)

(b)

(c)

Demand upon the board of directors to initiate an action in favor of the Corporation
shall not be required as a condition to the
maintenance of a Derivative Action.
Demand on shareholders to initiate an action in favor of the Corporation shall not be
required as a condition to the maintenance
of a Derivative Action.
(i)
A Derivative Action shall be dis-
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missed solely on the basis of a recommendation of a committee of independent directors, provided that:
(A)
the committee is composed entirely of independent directors
and is duly appointed in accordance with the law of this state,
and the board of directors expressly vests the committee
with full authority to act with
respect to the Derivative Action;
(B)
the independent directors conduct a thorough, independent,
and good faith investigation into
the allegations raised in the
complaint; and
(C)
the independent directors make
an express determination that a
reasonable business justification
exists for dismissing the Derivative Action, independent of the
merits of the litigation.
The burden of proof under this subsection (i) shall be on the party moving to dismiss the Derivative Action.
A Derivative Action shall not be dismissed pursuant to subsection (i) of
this section if:
(A)
one or more of the named defendants are directors or officers
of the Corporation in whose
right the Derivative Action is
asserted; and
(B) facts are alleged with particularity which, if proven, could result in the imposition of civil liability or criminal punishment on
a majority of the board of directors or on a person or persons
who control a majority of the
board of directors.
Derivative Actions to which this subsection (ii) applies shall be dismissed
on the basis of a recommendation of a
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committee of independent directors
only if the provisions of subsection (i)
of this section are complied with and
the court, upon an independent review
of the rationale and conclusions of the
committee, determines that such conclusions are fair and reasonable to the
Corporation and are not overridden
by a countervailing public policy. The
burden of proving the fairness and
reasonableness of the committee's
conclusions shall be on the party moving to dismiss the Derivative Action,
and the plaintiff shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery and to contest the committee's
conclusions.
(iii) In any Derivative Action dismissed
pursuant to subsections (i) or (ii) of
this section, the court shall state conclusions of law and fact sufficient to
permit appellate review.
SECTION 5: SETTLEMENT AND COMPROMISE
(a)

(b)

(c)

No Derivative Action shall be discontinued,
compromised, or settled without the prior
approval of the court exercising jurisdiction over the action, granted subsequent to
a settlement hearing.
Notice of the terms of the proposed settlement and the date, time, and place of the
settlement hearing shall be given in
whatever manner the court deems sufficient
under the circumstances to all holders of
Qualified Interests whom the court determines will be substantially affected by the
proposed settlement.
Upon request, holders of Qualified Interests
objecting to the proposed settlement, or, in
the court's discretion, a representative of
such objecting holders, shall be permitted a
reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery
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prior to the settlement hearing and, at the
settlement hearing, to present testimony
and evidence and to cross-examine witnesses for the proponents of the settlement.
The court shall approve the discontinuance,
compromise, or settlement of a Derivative
Action if, based on evidence presented at
the settlement hearing, such discontinuance, compromise, or settlement is reasonable under the circumstances.
In determining the reasonableness of a proposed settlement, the court shall consider,
without limitation, the following factors:
(i)
the benefit of the proposed settlement
to the Corporation,
(ii)
the objections of holders of Qualified
Interests,
(iii) any fees, costs, and expenses, including attorney's fees, requested by the
plaintiff, and
(iv) any indemnification or litigation expenses of the defendants paid or to be
paid by the Corporation.
In the absence of exact calculations of expenses, the parties shall estimate the maximum amounts of such payments. Payments
in excess of such estimates shall be made
only upon the showing that special circumstances exist that were not known or ascertainable at the time of the settlement
hearing.
A settlement of a Derivative Action shall
preclude other Derivative Actions raising
the same claims as the original action
unless:
(i)
reasonable notice of the settlement
was not given to all holders of Qualified Interests whom the court determines will be substantially affected by
the settlement; and
(ii)
the interests of all holders of Qualified
Interests were not fairly and adequately represented in the original
action.
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SECTION 6: SPECIAL RULES PERTAINING TO CLOSE
CORPORATIONS
(a)

(b)

(c)

An action otherwise classified as a Derivative Action shall be classified as a Direct
Action if the Corporation at the time of suit
and at the time of the transaction complained of is a Close Corporation and the
rights of creditors and other shareholders
of the Corporation are not prejudiced
thereby.
In any Derivative Action brought in the
right of a Close Corporation, the plaintiff
must be a holder of a Qualified Interest at
the time the action is brought and:
(i)
a holder of a Qualified Interest at the
time of the transaction complained of;
or
(ii) a holder of a Qualified Interest acquired by devolution of law from a
person who was a holder of a Qualified Interest at the time of the transaction complained of.
In the case of subsection (i) above, plaintiff's ownership of a Qualified Interest between the time of the transaction and the
time of the suit must be uninterrupted.
In any Derivative Action brought in the
right of a Close Corporation, the court may
award individual recovery according to the
plaintiff's pro rata ownership of a Qualified
Interest in the following situations:
(i)
where the Derivative Action is
against directors, officers, or other fiduciaries of the Corporation who have
appropriated corporate assets, and
the court determines that an individual recovery is necessary to prevent
any award from reverting to the defendant's control;
(ii) where one or more holders of a Qualified Interest in the Corporation have
personally benefited from the acts for
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which the suit seeks recovery, participated in the wrongful acts alleged in
the suit, become barred by laches, acquiescence, waiver or release, or acquired their interest from a person
falling within one of the foregoing
classes; or
(iii) where the Corporation is in the process of dissolution or has dissolved;
provided that the interests of creditors and
other holders of Qualified Interests of the
Corporation are not prejudiced thereby.
SECTION 7: DAMAGES
(a)

(b)

Except as provided in Section 6(c) of this
Title, upon judgment for the plaintiff in a
Derivative Action, any damages shall be
paid directly to the Corporation. Additionally or alternatively, the court may, in its
discretion, grant equitable relief including,
without limitation, a decree:
(i)
cancelling, altering, or enjoining any
resolution or other act of the Corporation or any other party to the action;
or
(ii) suspending or removing a corporate
official or director from office.
If entirely nonpecuniary relief is awarded,
the court shall direct the defendant to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of the plaintiff.
If a defendant is adjudged liable in a Derivative Action based exclusively on a Due
Care Violation, and the court expressly
finds:
(i)
such person's liability is not based on
misconduct, recklessness, or anything
other than ordinary negligence; and
(ii)
such person, or any Associate, has not
directly or indirectly gained personally from such violation;
then damages in such action shall not ex-
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ceed the aggregate sum of directors' fees,
salary, or other compensation received by
the defendant from the Corporation, or the
aggregate sum of the defendant's net taxable income before deductions for the five
years preceding the Due Care Violation,
whichever is greater.
SECTION 8: ABUSE OF PROCESS
In any action brought pursuant to this Title, the court
may in its discretion award costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, at any time against any party's counsel
or against any party if the court determines that counsel or a party committed an abuse of process, as defined by the laws of this state, or materially protracted
the litigation by making a motion, defense, pleading,
request for discovery, attempt to resist discovery, or
appeal without reasonable cause or in bad faith.
II.

A.

COMMENTARY

Statement of Purpose

Recognizing the tension between the potentials for public benefit and abuse inherent in derivative litigation, this Commentary
advocates a legislative approach designed to maximize public
benefits, such as accountability of management, and to minimize
public costs such as strike suits. This Commentary aims to articulate the primary purposes behind derivative litigation in order
to assist interpretation of the Statute and increase the likelihood
that these purposes will ultimately be achieved.
Two purposes underlie the derivative action: deterring misconduct by corporate decisionmakers and compensating the corporation and shareholders for harm caused by such misconduct.
Most courts have assumed that a compensatory rationale is the
primary foundation of the derivative action.3 0 This Commentary
30. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S.
703, 717 n.14 (1974) (pointing out that unjust enrichment could result if deterrence alone
justified the derivative action); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 673, 93 N.W.
1024, 1035 (1903) ("[I]t is not the function of courts of equity to administer punishment
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rejects compensation as the primary purpose of derivative
litigation
because the function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort or contract case, is not merely to compensate
the plaintiffs for wrongs committed by the defendant but
to prevent them, by removing from agents and trustees
all inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit
in matters which they have undertaken for others, or to
which their agency relates. 31
This Commentary constructs a statutory scheme for derivative
litigation around a deterrence rationale for a number of reasons.
First, injured parties must be identified before compensation
can be truly achieved. In many public corporations, the lightning
pace of ownership changes in the secondary market for corporate securities3 2 makes identification of actual victims impossible. Even if a sufficiently accurate identification system could be
practically developed, the miniscule personal benefit received
from a corporate recovery by the average shareholder raises serious doubts that identification is a goal worthy of its cost.
Second, after an injury to the corporation has occurred, shareholders may sell their investment at a price discounted to reflect
such injury. If a corporate recovery is later received, it is essentially a windfall to the new purchasers. The contemporaneous
ownership requirement found in virtually all traditional derivative suit statutes" is an attempt at reconciling this observation
with compensation theory. Because under traditional theory the
corporation is viewed as the "victim" of management misconduct, the amount of damages recovered by the corporation is not
reduced by the percentage of non-contemporaneous holders nor
is a portion of the recovery distributed to those shareholders
who sold at a discounted price. This approach produces an in...

A plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own case, not on the weakness of
the defendant's case.").
31. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,
81 (1969).
32. On Nov. 4, 1982, a record 149,350,000 shares were traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
33. The contemporaneous ownership rule requires that a plaintiff, in order to have
standing to maintain a derivative action, be a stockholder at the time of the transaction
complained of and at the time the action is brought. The requirement is found in virtually all jurisdictions. See, e.g., Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Weinstock v. Kallet, 11 F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch.
519, 199 A.2d 760 (1964); Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 569, 243
N.Y.S.2d 760 (1963).
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consistency between the reasoning and result of the traditional
theory that belies its stated purpose.3 '
The abolition of a contemporaneous ownership requirement in
the Statute 5 reflects a rejection of the view that the corporation
is a victim in need of compensation. This Commentary submits
instead that, subject to certain restrictions designed to prevent
abuse, a wide range of actors should be permitted to bring derivative actions to provide effective sanctions against wrongdoing.
Another critical shortcoming of a compensatory rationale is
that the corporate injury resulting from management misconduct is very likely to be smaller, on a pro rata basis, than that
suffered by individual shareholders. To the extent that a breach
of duty is viewed as a potential weakness of the corporation or is
likely to recur in the future, the market will discount the present
value of corporate securities beyond the actual loss incurred by
the breach. 6 All available evidence suggests that shareholder
compensation does not necessarily flow from a corporate
recovery.37
The final problem of a compensatory rationale is that not only
is shareholder recovery always indirect and frequently inadequate, it is, in most cases, de minimus on a per share basis. The
drain on societal resources that lengthy and complex derivative
litigation imposes cannot be justified by a recovery of a few
cents per share. The only rational explanation for allowing these
actions is that, by aggregating small individual losses into large,
collective ones, derivative actions produce sanctions sufficient to
deter.
34. As Professors Coffee and Schwartz note,
[t]o some degree, the anthropomorphic fallacy of viewing the corporation, rather
than its shareholders, as the victim is probably a necessary fiction accepted by
courts in order to avoid the potentially enormous problems involved in identifying the true victims. But to concede this is also to concede that courts are accepting an obvious fiction because they are less interested in compensation than
in seeing that wrongdoers do not escape sanctions. In short, the fiction of compensation serves the reality of deterrence.
Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 303.
35. Statute § 3.
36. One example of the signaling effect that a particular transaction may have on the
market can be observed in a self-dealing transaction between a parent corporation and
its majority-owned subsidiary. If minority shareholders are successful in enjoining the
transaction, the market value of their shares may not rise to its prior level because the
parent has signaled its intent to deal unfairly with the minority and may do so in the
future. Predictions of future losses are immediately reflected in a decline in present
share value. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 304 n.238. See also Note, The
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 1031 (1977).
37. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 304 n.240.
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Although deterrence should be recognized as the primary rationale for the derivative action, deterrence, standing alone, conflicts with other legitimate concerns. The concern most frequently expressed is that the objective of deterring wrongdoers
could lead to the unjust enrichment of shareholders not directly
injured by management misdeeds.3 8 In this context, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that the deterrence argument
[p]roves too much. If deterrence were the only objective,
then in logic any plaintiff willing to file a complaint
would suffice. No injury or violation of a duty to a particular plaintiff would have to be alleged. The only prerequisite would be that the plaintiff agree to accept the recovery, lest the supposed wrongdoer be allowed to escape
a reckoning. 39
This Commentary recognizes that there must be constraints
on the deterrence concept. Accordingly, the Statute imposes certain substantive limitations that restrict the class of plaintiffs
entitled to bring a derivative action. For example, section 3 of
the Statute prevents holders acquiring an interest after public
disclosure of wrongdoing from bringing a derivative claim. Additionally, through the definition of Qualified Interest in section
1(d), the Statute eliminates derivative actions by certain creditors and holders of attenuated beneficial interests. Although an
unfettered adherence to the deterrence concept in these instances would require an unlimited class of potential derivative
plaintiffs, the Statute's restrictions prevent frivolous litigation
while promoting serious claims, thereby preserving rather than
detracting from the fundamental utility of the derivative action
as a deterrence mechanism.
Another limit on the deterrence rationale is that, because punitive damages are unavailable, the action can only achieve a
cancellation of any expected gain from misconduct.4 Because
38. See ALI Code, supra note 21, at 235 (introductory note); Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 22, at 305.
39. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 717-18
(1974).
40. Damage to the "corporate image" resulting from adverse publicity generated by
the prosecution of a derivative action may increase the action's deterrent effect. Cf. Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing the possible negative effects of a
derivative action on the corporate image). The limited amount of publicity the typical
derivative action generates, the length of time necessary to bring it to a final determination, and the ability-and increasing inclination--of many corporations to mount image
advertising campaigns, however, reduce the deterrent effect of adverse publicity to a de
minimus level. See generally Comment, Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Busi-
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the potential gains from predatory acts such as self-dealing are
enormous, cancellation of expected gain upon detection is not an
effective deterrent. 41 Most other types of corporate wrongdoing,
however, present the potential for only limited gain. As Professors Coffee and Schwartz note, "due care violations typically involve little expected gain and frequently threaten enormous liabilities, and thus the potential deterrent threat posed by the
derivative action in this context is significant."4' 2
In summary, the Statute attempts to balance principles of
management accountability and deterrence from wrongdoing
against the inherent dangers and public costs of derivative litigation. The ultimate goal of the Statute is to provide a method
for regulating the litigation of legitimate intra-corporate disputes while establishing sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent exploitation.
B.

Classificationof Actions

The derivative action possesses a dual character-it is at once
representative and derivative. It is representative in that the
plaintiff undertakes to act not only for his own benefit but also
on behalf of others with an interest in the corporation. It is derivative in that the wrong is not done to the plaintiff personally,
but to the corporate entity. This dual nature has sometimes
caused courts to blur the distinction between derivative and direct actions. 3 The distinction between the actions is crucial because of the implications it has on the prosecution of the claim.
Characterization of a cause of action as derivative implicates all
the procedural requirements embodied in the Statute. Additionally, any recovery on a derivative claim is paid to the corporation, not to individual plaintiffs. In contrast, direct actions suffer
no extraordinary procedural requirements and allow individual
ness' Right to Speak Threatens the Administration of Justice, 1979 DET. C.L. REv. 623.
41. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcoN. 169
(1968) (arguing that "punishment cost" must equal or exceed "expected gain" to deter
an activity; where risk of apprehension is low, cancellation of gain alone has no deterrent
value).
42. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 307.
43. One court, for example, appears to have hopelessly confused the characterization
of derivative and direct actions: "This is a representative action derived from the Interborough Rapid Transit Company. It is brought in behalf of the plaintiffs and all others
similarly interested, as stockholders of said company, against the directors.
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 10, 99 N.E. 138, 139 (1912).
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plaintiffs to enjoy direct recovery on their claims. 44
Despite the importance of this distinction, however, many
courts, including the Supreme Court, have had difficulty articulating the distinguishing features of a derivative versus a direct
action. For example, Justice Frankfurter has written:
The contrasting difference between a stockholder's suit
for his corporation and a suit by him against it, is crucial.
In the former, he has no claim of his own; he merely has
a personal controversy with his corporation regarding the
business wisdom or legal basis for the latter's assertion of
a claim against third parties. Whatever money or property is to be recovered would go to the corporation, not a
fraction of it to the stockholder. When such a suit is entertained, the stockholder is in effect allowed to conscript
the corporation as a complainant on a claim that the corporation, in the exercise of what it asserts to be its uncoerced discretion, is unwilling to initiate. This is a
wholly different situation from what arises when the corporation is charged with invasion of the stockholder's independent right.45
Justice Frankfurter's statement fails to identify the underlying
distinguishing characteristics of derivative and direct actions. It
merely describes the consequences that flow from the
characterization.
In section 2 of the Statute, derivative and direct actions are
broadly defined based upon the traditional common law criteria.
A wrongful act that depletes or destroys corporate assets and
thereby injures security holders indirectly only by reason of the
direct injury to the corporation is derivative; conversely, a
wrongful act that denies or interferes with the rightful incidents
of security ownership gives rise to a direct action. This dichotomy, however, is not completely useful. Although under this rule
a suit for decline in value of corporate shares caused by a director's breach of duty is derivative because the holders are harmed
indirectly,"4 and a suit to force declaration of dividends is a direct action because it interferes with individual ownership
44. Plaintiffs, however, will not necessarily be disadvantaged by a finding that their
cause of action is derivative. Prosecution of a claim in the right of the corporation may
allow increased damage claims, thus qualifying the action under federal jurisdictional
requirements, as well as recovery of attorney's fees.
45. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847).
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rights, 47 without more, classification of other situations could become haphazard. Sensitivity to the four main policy considerations underlying the derivative/direct dichotomy, however,
should usually allow expeditious and consistent judicial
classifications.
The first consideration is that the recovery in a derivative action goes to the corporation. Thus, creditors, shareholders, and
others with a stake in the corporation share equally.4 In contrast, direct recovery by one holder does not benefit the corporation, nor does it benefit other injured holders unless brought as
a class action.
Second, because a judgment in a derivative action has res
judicata effect on all other derivative claims arising from the
same transaction, conclusion of a derivative action has a preclusive effect that prevents the multiplicity of suits that might otherwise be brought by individual security holders.49
Third, attorney's fees are awarded to successful plaintiffs in a
derivative action directly from the corporation. The plaintiff is
entitled to attorney's fees even if nonpecuniary relief is
awarded. 50 In a direct action, the same plaintiff must generally
look to the fund created by the action, if any exists.
Fourth, to permit proportionate individual recovery to shareholders in a direct action may, in some circumstances, amount to
a distribution of corporate assets either by dividend or partial
liquidation. Such a judicially mandated distribution could conflict with other principles of corporate governance."'
Application of these principles will assist courts in determining classification of an action under section 2 of the Statute.
Courts should consider whether the factual situation presented
requires a corporate recovery to protect the interests of creditors
or security holders not before the court, to avoid a multiplicity
of suits on the same claim, to provide adequate recovery of expenses, or to protect corporate control over the disposition of
invested capital.
47. See, e.g., Doherty v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1957); Knapp
v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956); Tankersley v. Albright, 80 F.R.D. 441
(N.D. I1. 1978).
48. See Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956); Knapp v. Bankers Sec.
Corp., 230 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1956); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa
1946); Niles v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 176 N.Y. 119, 122-23, 68 N.E. 142, 143-44
(1903).
49. See Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum).
50. Statute § 7(a).
51. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 251, 2 A.2d 904, 911 (1938) (injured
shareholder should not receive a greater dividend than financial condition of corporation
permits).
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There may be situations in which the action, though nominally a derivative one, may be better treated as a direct action
because of a promise or expectation legitimately relied upon by
an individual holder. For example, a holder may have a personal
cause of action against a third person to recover damages for
breach of contract even though a corporate cause of action results from the same wrongful act-such as mismanagement of
the corporate business and diversion of assets in breach of an
express contract with a shareholder.5 2
In section 2(b), the Statute provides that an action may be
classified as direct even though the principal injury is to the corporation. This provision allows a court, in its discretion, to provide a direct action when the injury is to the corporation and
there is "also special injury to the individual stockholder.""
This special injury may arise from pledgor-pledgee relation55
55
ships,"" fiduciary relationships, or contractual arrangements.
Some courts have allowed direct recovery under the special injury doctrine even when a derivative recovery for the benefit of
52. See, e.g., Buschmann v. Professional Men's Ass'n, 405 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1969)
(where plaintiff and bank to which corporation owed money entered into contract with
defendant, whereby plaintiff agreed to form new corporation, transfer assets in exchange
for common stock, and guarantee indebtedness of corporation, and defendant agreed to
operate and manage business of new corporation, and where defendant allegedly
breached contract by mismanaging business and diverting assets; plaintiff had direct
cause of action for breach of contract and corporation had cause of action for mismanagement arising out of the same wrongful acts).
53. Elster v. American Airlines, 34 Del. Ch. 94, 100 A.2d 219, 222 (1953) (wrongs
affecting individual rights of the shareholder plaintiff, such as preemptive or control
rights, may be pleaded as direct actions) (dictum). See also Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F.
522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710 (1897). In a recent opinion, the Delaware Chancery Court reiterated the Ester rule:
The fact that the corporation will suffer injury from the transaction which is
challenged does not preclude the Plaintiff from suing for the protection of individual rights if the Plaintiff also suffers special injury which the corporation as a
whole will not suffer.
Colonial Sec. Corp. v. Allen, No. 6778 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1983).
54. See Kono v. Roeth, 237 A.D. 252, 261 N.Y.S. 1048 (1932) (where defendant/director pledged stock to plaintiff as security for indebtedness and defendant/director conspired to render stock worthless by destroying value of the corporation, plaintiff may
maintain a direct action for violation of the pledgor-pledgee relationship).
55. See Blakeslee v. Sottile, 118 Misc. 513, 194 N.Y.S. 752 (1922) (where defendant/
director holds stock as trustee for plaintiff and wrongfully acquires a corporate opportunity, plaintiff may maintain direct action).
56. See Meyerson v. Franklin Knitting Mills, 185 A.D. 458, 172 N.Y.S. 773 (1918)
(plaintiff, who purchased defendant's stock pursuant to a contract whereby defendant
agreed to deliver the stock to the plaintiff and to sell goods and extend credit to the
corporation, had a direct cause of action against defendant for breach of covenants to sell
goods and extend credit).
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the corporation is available. 7 It is doubtful whether this potential multiple liability on directors and its concomitant windfall
to injured shareholders is justifiable, notwithstanding its deterrent effect. Therefore, if direct recovery is allowed under the
special injury doctrine, the plaintiff should be restricted to one
recovery, be it direct or derivative. In most cases, this restriction
will require inquiry into whether a derivative suit has been
brought or is presently pending for the same alleged wrong. If
the court determines that full recovery is likely to be accomplished derivatively, the direct action should be stayed or
dismissed.
Of course, the above proviso is inapplicable when a wrongful
act both depletes corporate resources and deprives a holder of a
personal right attaching to his interest. In such a case, for example when voting rights are infringed and the underlying transaction is unfair to the corporation, section 2(b) allows both actions
to be brought and maintained contemporaneously. This section
does not contemplate any set-off of one recovery against the
other, because each claim has an independent basis and dual recovery does not necessarily imply that any party is unduly
enriched.
C.

Standing to Litigate

Procedural requirements regulating the class of plaintiffs entitled to bring a derivative action are found in section 1(d) and
section 3. In these sections, the Statute attempts to balance the
policy and purposes supporting the derivative action. In particular, the Statute restricts the class of eligible plaintiffs based
upon the extent of their interest in the corporation. The personal interest of a particular plaintiff in the ongoing well-being
of the corporation is the touchstone in this regard, because if a
plaintiff with only a de minimus interest in the corporation were
allowed to sue derivatively, the action would be susceptible of
abuse by frivolous litigation. A plaintiff with a remote or contingent interest is unlikely to represent fairly a class of holders actually injured by alleged misconduct.5 8 Conversely, if the class of
eligible plaintiffs is restricted to persons with the status of
57. See, e.g., Cutler v. Fitch, 231 A.D. 8, 246 N.Y.S. 28 (1930); Blakeslee v. Sottile,
118 Misc. 513, 194 N.Y.S. 752 (1922).
58. Even a holder with a large vested interest must be capable of fully and fairly
representing a class of injured holders in order to have standing to litigate a derivative
action. See Statute § 3(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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shareholders, it is likely that a wide variety of persons would be
unable to gain redress for injury to their interests, and the deterrent effect of the derivative action would be reduced.5 9
Because of the complexity of these statutory requirements and
their importance to the overall statutory scheme, a brief summary of their organization and operation is in order. A detailed
analysis of each section and requirement follows.
Section 3 provides, with certain qualifications, that any holder
of a Qualified Interest has standing to bring a Derivative Action.
A Qualified Interest, as defined in section 1(d), means the interest held by shareholders of record and beneficial owners of corporate stock. The interest of beneficial holders can qualify under
section 1(d) only if the requirements of section 1(d)(ii), relating
to collective beneficial ownership and knowledge of the corporation, are met. Finally, the interests of convertible debt holders
are included under section 1(d)(iii).
Section 3 also provides that a holder of a Qualified Interest
can commence and maintain a Derivative Action only if the interest was acquired before disclosure of the wrongdoing complained of, or was acquired by devolution of law after that time.
1. Section 1(d): Definition of Qualified Interest- Through
the definition of Qualified Interest, the Statute delineates potential plaintiffs whose interest in the corporation is sufficient to
increase the probability that they are capable of fairly prosecuting an action on behalf of the corporation and reduces the likelihood of abuse.
Section 1(d)(i) embodies the traditional common law standing
requirement: shareholders of record in any corporation possess
an economic interest in the enterprise sufficient to support an
action brought on its behalf.6 0 This section, however, affirmatively rejects the common law doctrine that individual co-owners
lack independent standing to sue derivatively. 1 Because no minimum number or value of shares is required to attain individual
shareholder standing, it is incongruous to hold that co-owner
rights are not equal to those of sole owners. Accordingly, section
1(d) invests each co-owner or co-fiduciary with an independent
right to maintain a derivative action. Section 1(d)(ii) is the heart
59. See infra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-514
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-47 (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23A.08.460 (1969); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 49 (1971).
61. Cf. May v. DuPont, 42 Del. Ch. 570, 216 A.2d 870 (1967) (co-executor has standing to bring action on behalf of estate only if other executor agrees or on leave of the
court).
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of the Qualified Interest definition. It adopts the holding of numerous cases that beneficial owners of corporate shares are entitled to sue derivatively."2 Extending the class of potential derivative suit plaintiffs to beneficial owners, however, may be
insufficient to fully protect the action's deterrent effect. Because
of the convenience provided by brokerage services, many investors-both large and small-allow brokers to hold stock in
"street name" for the benefit of their account. Traditional beneficial ownership rules do not reach this substantial amount of
securities, even though beneficiaries of street name
accounts
63
investments.
their
to
attendant
risks
the
all
bear
In recognition of the inconsistency that inheres in the traditional approach, section 1(d)(ii) provides that a Qualified Interest includes the interest of a beneficial owner of shares held by a
nominee, trustee, or other fiduciary. This provision is similar to
that of Section 49 of the revised Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA),64 with two important differences. First, section
1(d)(ii) covers not only the broker holding stock as a nominee,
but also the bank or other institution acting as a trustee. Second, the section recognizes that a grantor may wish to deny the
beneficiary the right to sue derivatively. These two differences-one that enlarges the class of potential plaintiffs and one
that restricts it-are necessary to reflect realistically the present
state of stock ownership in the marketplace while allowing latitude for individuals to construct their own transactions.
a. Attenuated interests- Once the class of potential plaintiffs is expanded, the danger arises that the right to sue derivatively will be conferred on persons whose beneficial interest in
the corporation is so attenuated that no real personal stake in
the controversy exists. If the value of a plaintiff's interest in the
corporation is de minimus, the plaintiff is more likely to engage
62. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Landegger, 464 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1039 (1972); Arfsten v. Higby, 372 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1962); Jones v. Taylor, 348 A.2d 188
(Del. Ch. 1975); LaHue v. Keystone Inv. Co., 496 P.2d 343 (Wash. 1972); Report, Proposed Revisions of the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Actions by Shareholders, 37 Bus. LAW. 261 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MBCA Revisions].
.63. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 311.
64. MBCA Revisions, supra note 62, at 262. The revised § 49 provides in pertinent
part:
No action shall be brought in this State by a shareholder in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation unless (1) the plaintiff was a shareholder of record
or the beneficial owner of shares held by a nominee or the holder of voting trust
certificates at the time of the transaction of which he complains . ...
Id. The Committee drafting the revisions erroneously concluded that the above provision
was sufficient to include all street name accounts. See id. ("Street name ownership is
increasingly common, and should not be penalized.").
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in litigation for reasons relating to settlement value and attorney's fee awards rather than for redress of an injury to the corporation. Because a derivative action is designed to be brought
in the right of the corporation and all its holders of Qualified
Interests, it is also likely that the holder of a de minimus interest will be incapable of fairly representing the class of injured
holders. In such a situation, the potential for frivolous and unnecessary litigation so outweighs any deterrent value that some
restriction is necessary. For example, if beneficial owners were
allowed to sue derivatively without limitation, an individual with
vested pension rights could sue a corporation whose shares are
held by the fund, even though his economic interest in the fund
as a whole is miniscule and the interest possessed by the fund in
the corporation sued equally small. Such cases present a situation in which the potential for excessive litigation of claims with
little chance of success is very real. To address these cases, a
limitation on standing is appropriate.
Professors Coffee and Schwartz have proposed to limit the
class of potential derivative suit plaintiffs to holders of a beneficial interest in trust corpus "exceeding ten percent of the value
of such corpus. ' '6 5 Although the Coffee and Schwartz proposal
succeeds in establishing a threshold level below which economic
interests may become too attenuated to support derivative suit
standing, the proposal presents severe administrative difficulties.
To the extent that securities are not traded on an organized exchange or relate to a closely held or non-public corporation, valuation of interests in such enterprises poses considerable
difficulty. 6
To avoid valuation problems, the Statute adopts an indirect
measure of the holder's interest in the corporation. In a proposal
modeled after the proxy requirements of the California Corporation Code 67 and the ALI Code of Corporate Governance,6 8 section 1(d)(ii) requires that if a beneficial interest is collectively or
jointly held by ten or more persons, such an interest is a Qualified Interest only if the corporation has actual knowledge of all
beneficial owners of the interest. This provision serves as an indirect measure of the holder's interest in the corporation for two
reasons. First, it provides a measure above which an interest is
presumed to be qualified. If a beneficial interest is held collec65. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 332.
66. See Hardy, The Valuation of a Closely-Held Business, ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J.,June 1981, at 35.
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 605 (West Supp. 1985).
68. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 1.
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tively by fewer than ten persons, the Statute presumes that the
value of any one of their holdings is sufficient to maintain a derivative action. This conclusion can, of course, be rebutted by a
showing that the plaintiff is incapable of fairly and adequately
representing the class of injured parties. 9
If a beneficial interest falls below the measure, knowledge by
the corporation of the identity of actual holders of its securities
distinguishes the interest from an attenuated or cursory interest
attained merely to support frivolous litigation. If the beneficial
holders have put the corporation on notice of their interest in
the enterprise before allegations of wrongdoing occur, the individual holders should be allowed to protect their interests
through derivative litigation.
Because size and value, as they relate to a beneficial interest,
are relative terms, they say nothing about the likelihood of injury to the particular interest involved. The interests of some
holders, though small in relation to the enterprise, may nevertheless be significant in relation to the holder. Thus, the right to
sue derivatively should not turn on size or value of a beneficial
interest alone. It is doubtful whether many collective interests
would comply with the statutory restriction-the expense of
providing notice of beneficial interests held in large pension
funds, to continue the above example, is likely to outweigh the
benefits of protecting derivative rights; but where compliance is
met, genuine interest in the enterprise has been manifested
clearly, and the possibility of frivolous litigation is insufficient to
prevent the maintenance of a derivative claim.
b. Debt instruments- Section 1(d)(iii) includes within the
definition of Qualified Interest any unsecured debt security convertible into stock or carrying warrants or subscription rights.
7 0 conThis provision codifies the result in Hoff v. Sprayregan,
ferring standing on holders of convertible debentures. The Statute maintains the view that when an investor acquires an unsecured debt instrument convertible into stock, he also acquires
an interest in the corporation's future prospects and management integrity arising both from his right of repayment of principal and interest and from his contingent right to equity participation in the enterprise.
A number of judicial decisions have refused to permit holders
69. Statute § 3(a).
70. 52 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y.
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).

1971). See also Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491
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of convertible debentures to sue derivatively. 71 In Harif v. Kerkorian,72 for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery refused
to allow holders of convertible debentures to sue derivatively because of the court's view that all debenture holders, regardless of
conversion rights, are "creditors" of the corporation whose
"rights are determined by their contracts.

' 73

This Commentary

argues that the restrictive view of the status of convertible debenture holders evinced by the Harf court fails to comport with
the view of both holders of convertible securities themselves and
many corporate managers.
The holder of a convertible security is unlikely to view himself
solely as a creditor of the corporation for two reasons. First, the
performance of the corporation while the conversion option remains viable determines whether the holder will reap a profit
beyond return of investment. Second, the purchaser of convertible securities pays a premium for the conversion feature by accepting an interest rate significantly lower than non-convertible
issues of the same type. 4
Corporate managers are likewise unlikely to view convertible
security holders as mere creditors. Under the typical convertible
security agreement, the corporation has a duty to reserve a sufficient amount of shares to effect conversion of all outstanding
convertible securities as long as they remain viable." From the
standpoint of financial planning, management is aware that use
of a convertible issue facilitates capital formation by both delaying and reducing dilution of outstanding common stock. 76 Convertibles allow management to keep up reported per share earnings, thus maintaining the market value of currently outstanding
71. See, e.g., Kusner v. First Penn Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd in
part, 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
72. 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del.
1975).
73. 324 A.2d at 219.
74. See Note, Hoff and Harff: Does the Convertible Debenture Holder Have Standing to Maintain a Shareholder Derivative Action?, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 730, 748 (1975)
(citing H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 156 (2d ed. 1970)). The attractiveness of a
particular investment depends upon both its expected rate of return and its risk.
C. HALEY & L. SCHALL, THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS 93-105 (1973). A debenture
holder's "rate of return" is the interest rate to be earned on the investment; his "risk" is
measured by the rates that he may possibly earn. Id. at 102-03. The possibility of equity
participation in the corporate enterprise positively affects the former while not affecting
the latter. A lower fixed interest rate paid on convertible securities, therefore, produces
investor satisfaction equal to the higher rate paid on its non-convertible counterpart.
75. Katzin, Financial and Legal Problems in the Use of Convertible Securities, 24
Bus. LAW. 359 (1969).
76. Id. at 362.
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equity securities, while enjoying an influx of capital. Future conversions occur, it is hoped, at a time when higher earnings or a
larger capital base compensate for any dilutive effect.
Because of these obvious and fundamental differences between straight debt securities and convertible securities, decisions basing derivative rights on the distinction between "proprietary" and "creditor" interests are unrealistic and
inequitable. Section 1(d)(iii), therefore, provides that holders of
convertible securities are qualified to bring a derivative suit in
the right of the issuing corporation.
Sound policy reasons support the extension of derivative
rights to convertible security holders. First, the protection currently afforded convertible security holders under the law of
contracts and negotiable instruments 77 is insufficient to compensate adequately for corporate misdeeds. For example, should officers or directors of the corporation engage in self-dealing transactions or usurp corporate opportunities, the result could be a
significant decline in the market value of the corporation's stock
and, concomitantly, a decrease in the value of the conversion option. 78 If the corporate fund is depleted to the point at which
principal or interest cannot be paid or a conversion is wrongfully
disallowed, the convertible security holder has an adequate remedy for a portion of the injury. Unless the corporation or a
shareholder brings an action to correct the wrong, however, the
convertible security holder is without a remedy for injury to a
significant part of his investment. Even a token adherence to a
compensatory rationale, therefore, mandates the extension of
derivative rights.
Second, although in many ways the interest of the convertible
security holder in the well-being of the corporation is commensurate with that of holders of the corporation's stock, the convertible security holder's input into corporate affairs is far more
limited. The convertible security holder does not possess voting
rights, appraisal rights,7 or any of the other proprietary aspects
77. See 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2695,
2728, 2745 (perm. ed. 1968); H. HENN, supra note 74, § 155, at 277.
78. In the usual case, the convertibility feature allows the conversion or exchange of
the security for a fixed number of shares of stock of the corporation. If the value of the
stock is less than the value of the security, the conversion possesses no economic utility.
Moreover, if the outlook for the stock shows little chance of reaching the point at which
conversion is economically meaningful, the value of the conversion feature is negligible.
79. In most jurisdictions, statutes confer on individual shareholders the right to receive the cash value of their stock when they dissent to certain corporation action-such
as consolidation, merger, reorganization, sale or transfer of assets, or certain alterations
of preferential or voting rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1984) (appraisal
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of stock ownership designed to afford input into corporate affairs.8 0 The goal of deterrence is thus effectively served by the
extension of derivative rights to convertible security holders
who, without such rights, are virtually impotent to object to corporate actions affecting their ownership interests.
Finally, the danger of strike suits and collusive litigation does
not appear to be higher among holders of convertible securities
than non-convertible securities. The same devices adopted
throughout the Statute to avoid these dangers, therefore, are
equally adequate in the case of convertible security holders.
The convertibility feature provides the justification for the extension of derivative rights to convertible security holders, but
no practical or policy grounds support the extension of such
rights to all holders of debt securities.8 1 As an initial proposition,
it is unclear that holders of debt securities are injured by the
failure to enforce a corporate cause of action. Until a default on
the payment of interest or principal occurs, there is no cognizable injury. Although any depletion of the corporate fund increases the risk that such a default will occur,s debt security
holders are typically protected from such risks by restrictive indenture" or security 4 provisions. When default occurs, the debt
rights); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 11.35 (merger or consolidation), 11.60 (sale, lease, or
exchange of assets), 11.65 (right to dissent) (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
910 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (merger, consolidation or sale, lease or exchange of assets).
See generally 12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§
5906.1-.17 (perm. ed. 1984).
80. Non-shareholder investors are not afforded the protection of state corporate law
regarding the duties of care and loyalty owed by directors to the corporation. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
81. For an articulate presentation of the arguments supporting the extension of derivative rights to all corporate creditors, see Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf
of Solvent Corporations, 88 YALE L.J. 1299 (1979).

82. See id. at 1306 (arguing that creditors should be compensated for any increases in
risk over the life of the security).
The depletion/increased risk argument, when strictly applied, proves too much. Normal corporate distributions such as dividend payments deplete the corporate fund, and
thus increase the risk of default, in the same way mismanagement does. From the viewpoint of debt security holders, neither is significant unless it results in a default.
83. An indenture, sometimes referred to as a trust agreement or deed of trust, is a
contractual agreement between the debtor corporation and a trustee for the security
holders. Indentures, with minor exceptions, must be qualified under and are subject to
the terms of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1981). To qualify under the Act, the indenture must provide for an independent trustee, typically a
financial institution, that is subject to affirmative duties to protect the security holders.
The typical indenture contains numerous and elaborate covenants designed to protect
the debtor's assets from dissipation or encumbrance during the life of the security. These
covenants often limit corporate borrowings and pledge of assets, impose working capital
and liabilities-to-assets margins, restrict dividend payments, restrict redemption of outstanding stock, impose reserve requirements, and limit new issues of securities. See
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security holder is protected by equitable remedies85 and a priority position in insolvency proceedings.s In addition, when default occurs because of corporate mismanagement, many jurisdictions recognize an action by creditors against corporate
officers for negligence,87 and personal liability for corporate
debts may be imposed by statute.8 8 The extension of derivative
rights would add nothing to existing protections, while creating
an unsettling and perhaps burdensome change in the traditional
debtor/creditor relationship.
2. Ownership requirementsa. Contemporaneous ownership rule- The contemporaneous ownership rule requires that a plaintiff in a derivative action
own his interest in the corporation at the time of the wrong of
which he complains, or to thereafter have acquired his interest
A Borrower's View of the Model CorporateDebenture Indenture Provisions,21 Bus. LAW. 675,
680-81 (1966); Rodgers, The Corporate Trust Indenture Project, 20 Bus. LAW. 551
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 326-467 (1971); Garret,

(1965).
84. The creditor can gain additional protection through the use of a mortgage
bond-a bond secured by a mortgage or lien on specific property of the debtor
corporation.
85. In addition to the remedies provided by the law of contracts and negotiable instruments, see supra text accompanying note 77, the creditor's bill is available in many
jurisdictions as an additional or alternative means of obtaining relief. The theory is that
the corporate right of action against its fiduciary is a chose in action and therefore an
equitable asset that can be reached by creditors upon insolvency of the corporation. See,
e.g., A.B. Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Found., 35 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1940),
aff'd, 117 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941); Michelsen v. Penney, 10
F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Pritchard v. Myers, 174 Md. 66, 197 A. 620 (1938); Pennsylvania Bank v. Hopkins, 111 Pa. 328, 2 A. 83 (1886). Insolvency is not required when
the corporate fiduciary has acted with an actual intent to defraud creditors. See UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 9A U.L.A. 93 (1951). For a general discussion of the
creditor's bill, see 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§
1180, 1182 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
86. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1982).
87. See supra note 85 discussing creditor's bill.
88. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 85, § 1200. Fletcher notes that the varios statutory
schemes employ one or more of the following remedial approaches: (1) creating liability
where conditions precedent to right to do business have not been complied with, or
where all or part of the capital stock has not been subscribed for or paid in; (2) creating
liability for violation of certain provisions of the corporate statute; (3) creating liability
to creditors or others for negligence or breach of duty; (4) creating liability where debts
exceed a statutorily imposed formula; (5) creating liability where dividends are wrongfully paid; (6) creating liability for failure to file required reports and for the filing of
false reports. Id. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1983) (directors liable to corporation
and to creditors in event of insolvency, for unlawful dividend payments, stock purchases,
or redemptions); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 719(a), 720 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984)
(directors liable under certain circumstances for loans, dividends, stock repurchases, and
other distributions to shareholders, misappropriation of corporate assets, and negligent
mismanagement).
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by devolution of law.8 9 The rule has existed in substantially the
same form since its adoption under federal law in Hawes v. Oakland,90 and under state law in Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber.9' Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and a majority
of states have adopted the rule as a prerequisite to a derivative
action. 93
By definition, the contemporaneous ownership rule requires
that the plaintiff be a shareholder in order to have standing to
commence a derivative action. 4 Only California and Pennsylva95
nia expressly provide exceptions to this requirement.
The primary policy supporting the contemporaneous ownership rule is that a plaintiff should not be allowed to purchase a
lawsuit through the acquisition of a corporate interest after the
occurrence of injury because to do so may result in his unjust
enrichment.9 6 The main thrust of the rule, therefore, is to prevent a plaintiff from purchasing an interest at a price that already reflects the injury to the corporation and then bringing
89.

For a general discussion of the contemporaneous ownership rule, see 13 W.
supra note 85, at § 5981; H. HENN, supra note 74, at 263. See also Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
90. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
91. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903).
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (1984).
93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (1974 & Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 7.80(a) (Smith-Hurd 1985); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 46 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979
& Supp. 1985); OHIO Civ. R. 23.1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:3-6 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985). See also ALI Code, supra note
21, at 255; MBCA Revisions, supra note 62, at 262-63; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22,
at 312.
94' See, e.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049 (1977); Morr. CODE ANN. § 35-1-514
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-47 (1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1.1-43.1 (1969); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (West 1957 & Supp. 1985).
95. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985) (requiring that (a) there is
a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted; (b) no other action has been or is
likely to be asserted; (c) the defendant would otherwise retain a gain derived from a
willful breach of a fiduciary duty; and (d) relief will not unjustly enrich the plaintiff); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985) (court, in its discretion, may
permit derivative action to continue despite lack of contemporaneous ownership if there
is a strong prima facie case in favor of claim and if, without allowance of the claim,
"serious injustice" would result). See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
96. See Home Fire Ins. Inc. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 661-62, 93 N.W. 1024, 1030-31
(1903); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 711
(1974).
The policy behind Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is directed additionally or alternatively at another evil: collusive transfer of stock to nonresidents to
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Harbrecht, Contemporaneous
Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1978).
Obviously, a state law rule is not concerned with the federal anti-collusive policy and
instead focuses on the evil of purchased litigation.
FLETCHER,
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suit to restore the corporate fund, thereby recovering a windfall.
This Commentary argues for two reasons that the contemporaneous ownership rule is an inappropriate vehicle for addressing these policy concerns. First, the rule is unnecessarily overbroad and excludes from derivative actions two classes of
plaintiffs capable of presenting meritorious claims: certain
shareholder plaintiffs and all nonshareholder plaintiffs." As for
shareholder plaintiffs, the underlying assumption of the contemporaneous ownership rule that all persons acquiring an interest
after the occurrence of a corporate injury are necessarily aware
of such injury, or acquire the interest at a price that fully reflects the injury, is unsupported. In fact, available evidence indicates that this assumption is unrealistic and fallacious.
Even assuming that United States capital markets are efficient
so that market prices fully reflect currently available public information,9 8 evidence suggests that access to nonpublic or quasipublic information, such as information concerning corporate injury of a type effectively redressed in a derivative action, is generally limited to corporate insiders and financial specialists.9 9
Additional evidence suggests that these two groups can and do
exploit such nonpublic information to their advantage. l 0 It is
likely, therefore, that such exploitation at best delays, and at
worst prevents, accurate reflection of the injury by the market
price of the corporation's securities.
To illustrate, assume that a corporate insider or financial specialist, upon learning of rumors of corporate mismanagement or
of facts suggesting the likelihood of management misconduct,
sells his interest to a buyer lacking access to such information or
without the knowledge or ability to evaluate such information,
at a price equivalent to, or nearly equivalent to, the market price
before any injury occurred. When the corporate injury becomes
evident, the buyer is prevented by the contemporaneous ownership rule from bringing a derivative action because he was not
an owner at the time of the occurrence of the injury.0 1 Thus, the
rule denies derivative rights to shareholders with meritorious
claims who purchase at a nondiscounted price after a corporate
injury, even though there is no danger that the noncon97. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 313; ALl Code, supra note 21, § 7.02
comment, at 266-67.
98. See generally Note, supra note 36.
99. Id. at 1053-54.
100. Id.
101. See Russell v. Louis Melind Co., 331 Ill. App. 182, 72 N.E.2d 869 (1947).
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temporaneous plaintiff would recover a windfall."' 2
The same analysis applies to a nonshareholder owner of a
Qualified Interest, as defined in the Statute. 1' If the Qualified
Interest was purchased after the corporate injury occurred, but
before such injury was effectively reflected in the price of the
Qualified Interest, the contemporaneous ownership rule precludes the holder from initiating a Derivative Action. Moreover,
the rule operates to deny standing to all nonshareholder owners
of Qualified Interests. The anomalous results thus produced by
the contemporaneous ownership rule supply cogent reasons for
its modification.
Furthermore, the rule's adherence to a strict cutoff point to
measure standing magnifies the difficulty involved in determining the exact time of occurrence of corporate injury. For example, assume the corporation enters into a long-term property
lease with its controlling shareholder at an unfair rental before
the plaintiff purchases the corporation's stock. Although the corporation entered into the agreement before the plaintiff purchased his interest, its obligation, to pay rent continues after
plaintiff has acquired his interest. Arguably, the time of the
wrong occurred when the corporation entered into the lease, and
thus, because such time was before the shares were purchased,
plaintiff would be precluded by the contemporaneous ownership
rule from maintaining a derivative action. On the other hand,
one could argue that each period of accrued rent represents a
separate wrong. Under this interpretation, the plaintiff qualifies
as a contemporaneous owner for at least a portion of the injury.
The contemporaneous ownership rule thus fails to provide a
clear test for deciding standing, relegating the most important
issues to the vagaries of individual determinations. The result is
an unacceptable waste of time and money on procedural
litigation.
To counter the negative effects of the contemporaneous ownership rule, three states have adopted by statute the "continuing
wrong" doctrine. 10 4 Under that doctrine, a plaintiff who
purchases his interest after the initial occurrence of the wrong of
which he complains may maintain a derivative action if the al102. Conversely, a person who purchased corporate shares with the expectation that
the corporation would redress the injury, which expectation results in a higher purchase
price, is equally unable to effect recovery. See Harbrecht, supra note 96, at 1062.
103. For a discussion of the Statute's concept of Qualified Interest, see supra notes
60-88 and accompanying text.
104. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); OHIO Civ. R. 23.1; WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 180.405 (West 1957 & Supp. 1985).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 19:3

leged wrong is continuing at the time of purchase. 10 5 Other jurisdictions have adopted the continuing wrong doctrine through judicial decision. 10 6
Although the continuing wrong doctrine partially alleviates
the overbreadth of the contemporaneous ownership rule by permitting owners who purchased in the interval between commencement and termination of the wrong to maintain a derivative action, it does not completely cure the problem. Under the
doctrine, a plaintiff purchasing his interest after termination of
the wrong but before disclosure is still denied standing. Thus,
assuming the market does not effectively discount the price of
plaintiff's interest before disclosure, a plaintiff with a meritorious claim may lack a remedy.
Moreover, the continuing wrong doctrine does not address the
problems inherent in pinpointing the time of occurrence of a
corporate injury, and the time when such injury ceases. Such
problems are exacerbated in certain jurisdictions that have judicially adopted the doctrine but continue to apply it in a cautious
manner. Such jurisdictions often refuse to extend derivative
10 7
rights in any but the most obvious cases of continuing injury.
Another deficiency in the continuing wrong doctrine is that it
does not provide a clear test for determining what portion of the
wrong necessitates derivative recovery. For example, applying
the doctrine to the hypothetical of the long-term lease, it is unclear whether derivative relief should encompass only those
rental payments made after the plaintiff acquired his interest or
should extend to all injury proximately caused by the unfair
agreement. Finally, the continuing wrong doctrine may operate
to permit the very evils it was designed to prevent: purchased
litigation and unjust enrichment. The doctrine would permit
suit by a plaintiff who purchased his interest at a price reflecting
the present value of a continuing injury in circumstances in
which the injury continued long after public disclosure, thus allowing purchased litigation. The deterrence rationale must be
tempered to prevent the possibility of champerty once public or
105. Dykstra, supra note 9, at 95.
106. See, e.g., Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963) (under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiff allowed to maintain derivative action where transaction complained of occurred before plaintiff's purchase of stock and injurious acts continued after
purchase); Gluck v. Unger, 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (plaintiff
allowed to maintain derivative action alleging unfair settlement of corporate claim arising from merger where merger was consummated before plaintiff purchased interest, but
suit that resulted in alleged unfair settlement occurred after such purchase).
107. See, e.g., Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (1954);
Goldie v. Yaker, 78 N.M. 485, 432 P.2d 841 (1967).
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private disclosure of corporate injury has occurred. '0 8 For all of
these reasons, the contemporaneous ownership rule as modified
by the continuing wrong doctrine is an inadequate and ill-conceived solution to the evils that attend derivative litigation.
b. Alternatives to the contemporaneous ownership ruleThere are two statutory alternatives to the traditional contemporaneous ownership requirement. 0 9 These alternatives require
contemporaneous ownership, but permit suit by a noncontemporaneous owner if certain conditions are satisfied."'
. The California Corporation Code permits suit by a noncontemporaneous owner if the following five conditions are met:
(i) there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim
asserted on behalf of the corporation, (ii) no other similar
action has been or is likely to be instituted, (iii) the
plaintiff acquired the shares before there was disclosure
to the public or to the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of
which plaintiff complains, (iv) unless the action can be
maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived from
defendant's willful breach of a fiduciary duty, and (v) the
requested relief will not result in unjust enrichment of
the corporation or any shareholder of the corporation. 1 '
Pennsylvania permits such actions if "there is a strong prima
facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation and . . . without such suit serious injustice would result.""' 2
Although the Pennsylvania and California approaches cure
the overbreadth and timing problems created by the contemporaneous ownership rule by permitting noncontemporaneous
owners to sue under certain conditions, they are undesirable for
contrasting reasons. The California requirement is unwieldy in
application because it is overly specific. In the words of one commentator, "It is so encumbered with conditions and restrictions
that it would appear to be virtually meaningless, although a case
may arise now and then in which the plaintiff may be able to
satisfy all of [the] conditions.""13 The Pennsylvania requirement,
on the other hand, relies too heavily on a judicial determination
of standing rather than on a statutory standard. To determine
108. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
110. In addition, Professors Coffee and Schwartz advocate an approach based loosely
on the California scheme. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 313, 332.
111. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985).
113. 17 H. MARSH, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 14.31 (1985).
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whether a noncontemporaneous plaintiff has a "strong prima facie case" 1 14 a Pennsylvania court is required to hold a mini-hearing on the merits at the outset of the litigation. Thus, because of
its generality, the Pennsylvania approach unreasonably burdens
the court and the parties with procedural litigation.
c. Proposed standards- The ownership requirements of section 3 of the Statute are unique in that they do not adopt any
variation of the contemporaneous ownership rule. 115 The Statute
substitutes a new three-part requirement for the rule. 1 Initially, section 3(a) requires that the plaintiff hold a Qualified Interest in the corporation.1 7 Second, section 3(b)(i) requires the
plaintiff to have acquired the Qualified Interest before the alleged wrong to the corporation is disclosed either publicly, as
evidenced by market price, or privately to the plaintiff, as evidenced by purchase price. Thus, instead of focusing on the elusive moment when corporate injury actually occurs or when it
ceases, the cutoff point for standing to maintain a derivative action is the time of public or private disclosure of the injury.
Section 3(b)(i) provides two objective standards for determining whether disclosure has occurred. First, if information concerning the alleged wrong is made generally available to the
public, and, on the basis of such information, the market discounts the value of the interest purchased or otherwise reacts to
the information, public disclosure for the purpose of the Statute
has occurred. Thus, until the public information is reflected in
the price of the corporate interest purchased, public disclosure
within the meaning of section 3(b) has not occurred. For example, disclosure of corporate injury in an obscure publication,
having no impact on the market price of the corporation's securities, does not constitute section 3(b) public disclosure." Second, even if there has been no public disclosure of the corporate
injury, any private disclosure to the plaintiff before acquiring an
interest constitutes disclosure under the personal disclosure
standard of section 3(b), so long as the price paid for the interest
reflects the disclosed information.
114. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(A) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1985).
115. Section 3 of the Statute is a unique hybrid of approaches found in certain state
statutes and academic commentaries. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(1) (West 1977 &
Supp. 1985); ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02(a)(ii); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at
312-33.
116. See Statute § 3(a)-(c).
117. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
118. The intent of this section is to create an objective standard based on a concept
of public disclosure similar to that employed to enforce the insider trading prohibitions
of the federal securities laws. See generally Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Section 3(b)(ii) allows plaintiffs whose interests devolved upon
them by operation of law to maintain derivative actions, provided that the person from whom the interest was acquired
would have qualified under either of the foregoing tests. Under
section 3(b)(ii), the disclosure inquiry shifts from the plaintiff to
his predecessor in interest. To maintain the action, therefore,
the plaintiff must plead and prove that his predecessor acquired
the interest before the time of public or private disclosure.
Holders of Qualified Interests in closely held corporations are
exempt from the requirements of section 3(b). 119 By definition
there is no market for the shares of a closely held corporation, so
public disclosure of injury is irrelevant. In addition, the time of
private disclosure standard of section-3(b) is not suitable for
shareholders of closely held corporations, because it requires evidence of an effect on the purchase price related to disclosure of
the wrong. Again, because there is no market for closely held
shares, the measurement and valuation problems persist. Consequently, section 6 applies special standing requirements to
closely held corporations.
The final ownership requirement of the Statute, found in section 3(c), requires the plaintiff to have held his Qualified Interest continuously from the time of disclosure of the injury complained of until the last appeal of the action has elapsed. This
requirement reflects the same policy concern as section 3(a)'s requirement that the plaintiff be capable of fully and fairly representing the class of persons injured by the alleged
wrong-namely, that the plaintiff is acting in the best interests
of the corporation and not solely for personal benefit.
To illustrate, if plaintiff divests himself of his interest during
the litigation, he no longer has an incentive to make decisions in
the best interests of the corporation, but instead may make decisions on the basis of personal interests. Although key decisions
relating to the continuation of the derivative suit are subject to
court approval, 12 0 numerous important decisions relating to the
prosecution of the action are made by the plaintiff and his attorney in the normal course of litigation. To discourage collusion
and subterfuge, therefore, it is desirable that the plaintiff retain
a personal stake in the corporation throughout the action.
119. Statute §§ 3(b), 6. Section 1 of the Statute defines a "close corporation," to
which § 6 is applicable. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
120. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-50 (1949);
Schupack v. Covelli, 498 F. Supp. 704, 705 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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Section 3(c) is also designed to discourage "purchased litigation" in that an individual holding a Qualified Interest at the
time of corporate injury but before disclosure of such injury
could sell the interest at the prevailing market price and, after
disclosure, acquire another Qualified Interest at a price reflecting the injury. Without the section 3(c) requirement of continuous ownership, such a holder would have standing to bring and
maintain a derivative action, because he acquired his original
Qualified Interest before disclosure. The plaintiff in this case,
however, is no better qualified to maintain the action than any
person disqualified by the requirements of section 3(b). 12 ' The
continuoui ownership requirement is thus supported by the
same policies underlying.section 3(b) and is, in fact, necessary to
maintain the integrity of that section.
D. Dismissal
The unique character of the derivative suit as a cause of action brought in the right of the corporation raises important issues regarding who speaks for the corporation in the prosecution
of the action. Put directly, should a holder of a Qualified Interest be allowed to prosecute a corporate claim that the directors
have determined should not be pursued? Corporations are turning with increasing frequency to committees of independent directors to evaluate derivative claims and to provide the basis for
dismissal of such claims. Section 4 of the Statute addresses the
issue of when, and under what circumstances, a derivative cause
of action may be dismissed on the recommendation of a committee of independent directors.
1. The basis of corporate control- In Wolf v. Barkes,"2 the
Second Circuit unequivocably held that a corporation may obtain an involuntary dismissal of a derivative claim on the basis
of a settlement between the corporation and the named defendants. 12 The court evidently believed that the corporation should
have control of the corporate cause of action, even if styled as a
derivative claim. The natural progression of this rationale is dismissal based on the recommendation of a committee of independent directors. In fact, because the members of the commit121. See Statute § 5 (Derivative Action to be settled, compromised, or discontinued
only upon court approval after settlement hearing). See also infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
122. 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
123. Id.
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tee are "independent," it can be argued that dismissal on their
recommendation is preferable to the out-of-court settlement in
Wolf.. 24
The central point to remember in discussing the termination
of a derivative cause of action by the corporation is that the vast
majority of such actions are brought against persons in positions
of influence or control in corporate management. One of the
main functions of the derivative action is to provide an effective
mechanism to deter misconduct by management and those in
nominal control of the corporation. To conclude, therefore, that
the board of directors is empowered in all circumstances to engineer the dismissal of derivative claims would eviscerate the action's utility as a deterrence mechanism.
The Wolf court recognized that structural bias 125 may corrupt
any corporate decision regarding a derivative action against its
own officers or directors: "[S]ome suspicion may attach to a settlement made by a board of directors that has shown no inclination to collect corporate claims until its hand is forced by the
start of a derivative suit. ' 12 6 The presumption of propriety, independence, and good faith normally accorded management decisions and embodied in the business judgment rule1 27 is, therefore, called into question in the present context. The real
question is not whether the corporation is empowered to dismiss
actions brought on its behalf- Wolf unequivocally establishes its
right to do so-but what judicial standard of review will apply
to such decisions.
2. The doctrine of deference-Auerbach v. Bennett- The
initial judicial consideration of a board of directors' decision to
seek dismissal of a derivative action based on the recommendation of a committee of independent directors resulted in a holding that courts must defer to the business judgment rule in reviewing the recommendation of an independent committee. In
124. The Wolf court opined that the out-of-court settlement, even if collusive, would
be subject to attack by disgruntled shareholders in a subsequent proceeding for fraud or
waste of corporate assets. Id. at 996-97.
125. Structural bias has been defined as "an attitude that attaches to a directorship
and rests on cultural ties that antedate the director's election or appointment, which
combine to draw the directors to the defendants' side." Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALl Project,
1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 1010.
126. 348 F.2d at 997.
127. The law traditionally gives directors and executive officers wide latitude in
which to exercise their discretion. No liability will attach for good faith errors or mistakes of judgment. See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891) (citing cases);
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119 (Del. Ch. 1971). This notion is commonly referred
to as the business judgment rule.
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Auerbach v. Bennett,12 8 New York's highest court held that
under the business judgment rule a court is powerless to evaluate the legal, ethical, commercial, or economic grounds supporting a committee's recommendation that a derivative suit be dismissed. 2 9
The
Auerbach court reasoned
that these
considerations are exclusively within the domain of the board of
directors and that the court's examination is limited to areas
that have traditionally remained open to inquiry under the business judgment rule: the directors' independence and good
faith.3 0 The court allowed that, under certain circumstances,
the limited areas of permissible inquiry may include challenges
to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's procedures,' 3 ' but held that the substantive bases of the committee's
recommendation are entitled to uncritical judicial deference.
This Commentary argues that the doctrine of deference created by Auerbach is inappropriate. First, the foundation of the
doctrine, the business judgment rule, is inapposite in the context
of a recommendation of dismissal by a special litigation committee. The business judgment rule is premised on the realization
that investors assume the risk of bad business judgment by
management, and that it is in the interests of investors that the
law not create incentives for overly cautious management by second-guessing corporate decisions and holding risk-taking managers liable, in hindsight, for bad decisions. The rule extends, however, only so far as its underlying rationale. 3 2 In the context of a
special committee's recommendation, it cannot reasonably be
said that investors assume the risk of breaches of fiduciary obligations by management to the same extent that they assume the
risk of commercial decisions. The overwhelming deference the
business judgment rule accords to decisions involving commercial transactions is, therefore, unwarranted. In addition, closer
scrutiny of the committee's recommendation is not likely to subject committee members to potential liability for improper decisions, because a court's rejection of the recommendation nullifies
its adverse impact on the corporation.
Second, because the issue of terminating derivative litigation
128. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
129. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
130. Id. at 623-24, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
131. See id.
132. See McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1974)
(corporate decision a result of management failure to exercise oversight and supervision);
Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (business judgment rule inapplicable
where corporate decision lacks business purpose); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec.
Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918) (corporate decision tainted by conflict of interest).
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requires the weighing of probabilities of success on the merits
and recovery of damages, the committee's recommendation is
not strictly within the board's expertise. It is an area in which
the expertise of the court is more appropriately applied. 1 3 For
these reasons, this Commentary argues that the deference accorded to the special litigation committee by the Auerbach court
is unwarranted. The court must take an active role in evaluating
such recommendations under certain circumstances to maintain
the credibility of the derivative action as a deterrence
mechanism.
3. Step-by-step-Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado and Aronson
v. Lewis- In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,'3 ' the Delaware Supreme Court took a very different view from that of the
Auerbach court of the power of an independent committee of
directors to terminate derivative litigation.1 35 The Zapata court
held that, where a derivative action has been properly commenced without prior demand on the board of directors, an action may be terminated on the basis of a recommendation of a
committee of independent directors when: (1) the committee has
determined, reasonably and in good faith, that prosecuting the
action is not in the best interest of the corporation, and (2) the
court has determined, in the exercise of its own business judgment, that there is no reason why the action should be continued. 13 In exercising such judgment, the court is to consider not
only the corporation's "best interests" 137 but also matters of
"law and public policy."'3 8
The Delaware Supreme Court specified a two-step procedure
to be followed in evaluating the committee's recommendation.
First, the court must satisfy itself that the committee was genu133. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983). When considering the standard of review under Connecticut law of a recommendation of a committee of independent directors to dismiss a pending derivative action, the Second Circuit noted: "A court is not ill-equipped to review the merits of that
conclusion. Even when the Committee recommendation arises from the fear of further
damage to the corporation ... courts are not on unfamiliar terrain." Id.
134. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
135. Id. at 788-89. Zapata involved a claim that controlling officers and directors of
the corporation breached their fiduciary duty by accelerating the exercise date of certain
stock options they owned in part. The plaintiff contended that by permitting exercise of
the options immediately prior to the announcement of an issuer tender offer-which had
the effect of increasing the market price of the corporation's shares-the defendants reduced the amount of capital gain realized by the option holders and thereby reduced the
tax deduction available to the corporation.
136. Id. at 789.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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inely independent, that it acted reasonably and in good faith,
and had reasonable "bases" for its recommendation.' 3 9 The burden of proof on these issues lies with the defendant. 140 Second,
the court must determine whether a corporate interest or matter
relating to the public interest warrants a continuation of the derivative action."' In making this determination, the court may
disagree that the corporation's interest would be best served by
dismissal, or may determine that public policy considerations
override the corporation's interest in dismissal."'
In creating this step-by-step analysis, the Delaware Supreme
Court displayed a keen sensitivity to balancing the corporation's
need to dispose of burdensome derivative actions expeditiously
with the policy goal of maintaining the derivative action as an
effective means of deterring misconduct. By seeking a middle
course between a deferential and a stringent standard of review,
the court was motivated by a desire to avoid the abusive potential of structural bias inherent in corporate decisionmaking."13
The Zapata court found the business judgment rule inappropriate for addressing these concerns. Thus, requiring the committee to prove its independence and good faith and the reasonableness of its conclusions is, in effect, a surrogate investigation
of the committee's structural bias. The judicial activism embodied in Zapata's second level of analysis is a striking contrast to
the passivity of the Auerbach approach and reveals that in certain cases the court is best positioned to determine the fate of
the action. The test the Zapata court developed, however, suffers from serious structural flaws.
The most serious flaw in the Zapata test is its focus on the
demand requirement. The two-step analysis applies only to
139. Id. at 788-89. The Zapata court likened this first step of review to a motion for
summary judgment, because the motion is denied if genuine factual issues exist. Id. The
court suggests, however, that the review may go further by actually resolving factual
disputes through a mini-trial. Id. at 788 n.15.
140. Id. at 788-89. This holding effectively shifts the burden placed in pre-Zapata
cases. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1145 (1982); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979); Rosengarten v. ITT Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
141. 430 A.2d at 789.
142. Id.
143. The court stated:
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors
• . . and committee members. The question naturally arises whether a "there
but for the grace of God go I" empathy might not play a role. And the further
question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable
investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.
Id. at 787.
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cases in which demand on the board is excused; it does not apply when demand is required and rejected.144 The result of this
focus shifts analysis from a rational resolution of the problems
posed by dismissal on a committee's recommendation to the
technical resolution of the demand required/demand excused
dichotomy.
The demand requirement is essentially a device to assure that
intra-corporate remedies are exhausted before a derivative action is brought. 145 It is not probative of the question of whether

the recommendation of a special litigation committee should be
honored. 146 The Zapata court, therefore, artificially embosses
the demand required/demand excused dichotomy on the question of the capacity of a special litigation committee to engineer
the dismissal of a derivative action. In so doing, the Delaware
court promotes confusion and shifts the inquiry to subsidiary
questions.

1

4

144. Id. at 784 n.10. The two-step analysis is also applicable to cases in which demand was actually made, but under circumstances in which it could be legitimately excused. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983); Alford v. Shaw, No. 8426SC371, slip op. at n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1985).
At least one court has interpreted the two-step analysis as not limited to demand excused cases. In In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1983), the
court, while applying Delaware law, held that the two-step analysis of Zapata applies
even in a demand required case and that step two is in the discretion of the court. Id. at
930. See also Mills v. Esmark, 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Although
the Zapata opinion does distinguish between demand and non-demand cases, we hesitate to draw [a] bright line ....
") (dictum). The weight of precedent, see, e.g.,
Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.
1982); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), and commentary, see, e.g., Cox, supra
note 125; Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative
Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw. 27 (1981), is against this interpretation of Zapata.
145. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.1 (2d ed. 1979); 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1831 (1972).
146. Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980):
A determination that directors are not so interested in the underlying transaction as to excuse demand on them does not mean that they are so disinterested
as to enable them to eliminate the lawsuit. The rationale of the cases holding
that demand must be made even if the directors have been or may be- made
defendants, is not that the directors can preclude suit despite being defendants,
but rather that they might cause the corporation to pursue the suit despite being defendants.
147. The outcome determinative nature of the Delaware focus on the demand requirement is illustrated by comparing two decisions of the same panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp.
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982), shareholder plaintiffs asserted
derivative claims against five directors based on Delaware law and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. II 1984), alleging misappropriation of corporate funds and related misleading disclosures. Prior to the commencement of the derivative action, a civil suit brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission was settled by a consent decree establishing audit committees to determine
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The direct result of Zapata is an increased emphasis on the
demand requirement. Because the applicability of any substantive judicial review of a dismissal recommendation hinges on the
demand issue, demand futility " " has become a central issue in
Delaware derivative litigation. Realizing the impact of this rewhether the corporation should pursue legal action against the five directors. Following
their investigation, the audit committees advised the board not to bring suit if the five
directors made restitution to the corporation in a stated amount. Despite such reimbursement having been made, plaintiffs made a demand that the corporation prosecute
the action. By a vote in which the interested defendant-directors did not participate, the
demand was rejected and defendants sought dismissal of the suit based on the audit
committees' recommendation. The lower court granted the motion. 513 F. Supp. at 12124.
In Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979), and Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982), plaintiff claimed that certain
officers and directors had violated Delaware common law fiduciary duties and § 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by accelerating the exercise date of certain stock
options, thereby bestowing financial gain on themselves to the detriment of the corporation. 448 F. Supp. at 1034-36. The board established a special litigation committee comprised of two outside directors elected to the board after the alleged wrongdoing. The
committee determined that the action was not in the best interest of the corporation,
and the lower court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 485 F. Supp. at
277-78.
Focusing on the dichotomy created by the Delaware approach, the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of the action in Abramowitz because a demand had been made and rejected, 672 F.2d at 1032, but reversed the dismissal in Maldonado, where a demand was
excused on the grounds of futility, 671 F.2d at 731. The Second Circuit remanded Maldonado to the lower court to apply the second step of the Zapata test. Id. at 732.
The reasoning for these differing results is not persuasive. The central concern of the
Zapata court, structural bias, is evident in the committees' recommendation in
Abramowitz. In reaching the decision that suit was not warranted if the directors reimbursed the corporation to a stated amount, the committees in Abramowitz betrayed an
overwhelming bias towards the directors:
The amounts which the Audit Committees have recommended should be reimbursed may not necessarily be the maximum amounts which the companies
could obtain from such officers or directors in an action naming them as defendants, where the full range of judicial procedures for the ascertainment of facts
would be available, or if presumptions arising from the absence of appropriate
records were utilized to determine the amounts due.
513 F. Supp. at 124.
The committees rationalized that, because of the vagaries of litigation, their recommendation was nevertheless "fair and equitable." 672 F.2d at 1028. As one commentator
has noted, "[i]f [the court] had examined the case under Zapata's . . . analysis, the
court would have required a more fully developed report of these possibilities in place of
the committees' glib recognition of the uncertainties of litigation." Cox, supra note 125,
at 981. The case is an anomaly, produced by the misplaced focus on the demand
requirement.
148. Under Delaware law, a demand on the board of directors is not required as a
prerequisite to the maintenance of a derivative action if it is apparent from facts alleged
with particularity that demand would be futile, because the act complained of was done
by a majority of the stockholders or otherwise by defendants who have control over the
corporation and are hostile or adverse in interest to the plaintiff's demand. See Brody v.
Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1973).
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suit, the Delaware Supreme Court proceeded to formulate a new
step-by-step analysis for the demand issue.
In Aronson v. Lewis,'4" the Delaware court ruled that for a
failure to make demand to be excused for futility, the complaint
must allege facts with particularity that create a reasonable
doubt that the challenged transaction was a product of business
judgment.1 50 The court, accepting the plaintiff's particularized
allegations as true, is to determine whether the business judgment rule is unavailable because those allegations raise a reasonable doubt as to: (1) whether the board majority was disinterested and independent 5 ' or (2) whether the majority, even
though disinterested and independent, did not validly exercise
its business judgment. The court makes this determination on
the following criteria: (a) the directors must inform themselves,
prior to making the business decision, of "all material information reasonably available to them;"1'52 (b) the directors must act
with requisite care in the discharge of their duties;15 3 and (c) if
the directors have abdicated their functions and failed to act,
5
the business judgment rule is inapplicable. Zapata and Aronson together require that, in all but the most
egregious cases, a Delaware plaintiff must pass muster under a
six-step analysis to survive a motion to dismiss based on the recommendation of a special litigation committee. 5 5 Such a proce149. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
150. Id. at 814.
151. A director is interested, according to the Aronson court, if he appears on both
sides of a transaction or expects to derive personal benefit from it in the sense of selfdealing. The court opined that an expectation of benefit devolving upon the corporation
or all stockholders generally is not sufficient to make a director interested. Id. at 813.
152. Id. at 812.
153. Id. The court determined that the requisite standard of liability was gross negligence. Id. This holding departed from earlier Delaware cases that articulated a number
of other standards, although all required more than simple negligence. See, e.g., Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) ("fraud or gross overreaching"); Getty
Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) ("bad faith"); Moskowitz v.
Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963) ("fraud"); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A.
257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) ("reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests . . .of stockholders").
154. 473 A.2d at 813. A conscious decision to refrain from acting may, however, be a
valid exercise of business judgment so long as it is taken with appropriate investigation
and care. Id.
155. Assuming the defendant can carry its burden of showing the disinterestedness
and good faith of the committee, the plaintiff must prove that demand is excused as
futile under the four-step Aronson analysis. The steps of the Aronson analysis are: (1)
Was the board majority disinterested? (2) Was the board majority independent? (3) Did
the board inform themselves of all material information available to them? (4) Did the
board exercise the requisite care? In addition to proving that demand is excused as futile, the plaintiff must also persuade the court that the action is not frivolous under the
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dural gauntlet is hardly conducive to promoting the scrutiny
that Zapata implied is necessary to minimize the effects of
structural bias. 15 In fact, it is not surprising that the second
level of review under Zapata is almost never reached 5 7 and that
the net result of the complicated Delaware approach is similar to
15
the deferential posture of Auerbach. 8
standard of Zapata's first step. Only then may the court evaluate the merits of the recommendation under Zapata's second step.
156. At least two courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the Zapata formulation
in this regard. In Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa
1983), the Supreme Court of Iowa analyzed the Zapata rationale and concluded that the
test formulated by the court failed to adequately guard against structural bias. Id. at
716. The Iowa court opined that "it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent committees are free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow from
the directors who appoint them." Id. The court concluded that the only effective means
of avoiding the potential for structural bias in some cases is by removing the opportunity
for structural bias in all cases. Accordingly, the Iowa court held that directors who are
parties to derivative litigation are without power to delegate authority with respect to
such litigation to an independent committee. Id. at 718. In a recent North Carolina case,
Alford v. Shaw, No. 8426SC371 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1985), the Court of Appeals
adopted a similar rule as the law of that state.
Although the Iowa and North Carolina courts have demonstrated a refreshing sensitivity to the reality of structural bias, the medicine they propose may be worse than the
disease. If the entire board are named defendants in a derivative action, under the Iowa/
North Carolina approach the corporation is powerless to appoint an independent committee. The only alternative is to petition the court, in the exercise of its equity powers,
to appoint such a committee. Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718; Alford, slip op. at 7. Such an
approach encourages plaintiffs to craft claims against the entire board in order to hamstring the corporation, and fails to acknowledge the corporation's need to fairly and expeditiously rid itself of nonmeritorious claims.
In addition, the Iowa/North Carolina approach fails to address the ability of the board
to effectively appoint a committee when a minority of the board are named defendants,
or when wrongdoing by a person in control is alleged.
157. To date, there exists only one reported decision in which a trial court applied
both steps of the Zapata analysis in ruling on a motion to terminate a derivative action
made by defendants on the basis of a committee recommendation. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982). After applying its own
independent business judgment under step two of the Zapata test, the Abella court
agreed with the committee recommendation that the suit should be dismissed. Id.
In the first and only case to date of the Delaware Chancery Court ruling on a motion
to terminate under the Zapata test, the court undertook an exhaustive review of the
Zapata test and granted the motion to dismiss under step one. See Kaplan v. Wyatt, No.
6361 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 1984). Although the Kaplan court stated that it was "unnecessary" to proceed to the second step of Zapata where the committee has demonstrated
good faith, disinterestedness, and reasonable basis, the court nevertheless proceeded to
analyze the merits of the suit to determine whether it "deserves further consideration
through the device of derivative litigation." Id. Given the Kaplan court's opinion that
the Zapata test is a "legal mouthful ... fraught with practical complications," id., it is
not surprising that the court elected to "cut the matter off at step one of the Zapata
procedure." Id.
158. Although a number of reported cases purport to adopt the Zapata test in one

form or another, or purport to decide a motion to dismiss under such test, see, e.g., Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco
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4. The statutory standard of review- The standard of review embodied in section 4 of the Statute attempts to counteract
the effects of structural bias by increasing the court's involvement in the review of dismissal recommendations, while preserving the committee mechanism as an expedient method of terminating frivolous actions. In addition, the section seeks to
eliminate the preclusive effect of the demand requirement by
creating a uniform standard of review.
The most provocative aspect of the standard in section 4 is its
elimination of the demand requirement in all cases. 1 The purpose of the section is to avoid the artificial dichotomy created by
the Zapata test 60 and to create a single review process applicable in varying degrees to all cases.
In its proposed Code of Corporate Governance, the ALI seeks
to promote the same goals as the Statute but nevertheless retains the demand requirement. 16 1 Under the ALI Code, if a demand is made and rejected, the directors' decision is subject to
judicial review under the identical standards
used to review a
1 62
committee's recommendation of dismissal.
The ALI approach reduces the demand requirement to a nullity, and ignores the realities of modern corporate actions. If, as
the reporters of the ALI Code suggest, a mechanism is necessary
"to give the board an opportunity to take over the litigation or
pursue internal reforms or sanctions," ' 63 it is unclear that the
demand requirement is the proper mechanism. Demands are rejected in nearly all cases164 and no empirical evidence demonCo., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (E.D. Ill.
1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981);
Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afl'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.
1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 671 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1982); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub noma.Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Kaplan v. Wyatt, No. 6361 (Del. Ch. Nov.
5, 1984), no court has actually denied a motion to dismiss under the Zapata test.
In fact, the only case to date in which a motion to dismiss based on a committee's
recommendation was denied, Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279
(1978), was decided under traditional business judgment rule criteria. The court denied
the motion because it found that the committee lacked disinterestedness. Id.
159. Statute § 4(a)-(b).
160. See supra notes 134-58.
161. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02(b).
162. Id. § 7.03(a)(ii). Under the ALI Code, a court is required to make its own independent determination that the business justification advanced in support of the decision: (A) is not outweighed by the probable recovery or other relief that the court determines is likely to result from the litigation, (B) does not frustrate any authoritatively
established public policy, and (C) is advanced in good faith. Id. § 7.03(c)(ii).
163. Id. § 7.03 comment at 315.
164. See Cox, supra note 125, at 961 n.7.
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strates that demand promotes intra-corporate remedies. If, however, the standard of review encourages the use of a special
committee as a direct mechanism for dismissal in proper cases,
the board will be encouraged to establish such a committee and
to undertake remedial measures necessary to provide the basis
of a dismissal recommendation likely to pass judicial scrutiny.
The special litigation committee mechanism has, in fact, "revolutionized the process of derivative suit resolution 1

5

and has

become a generally accepted mechanism in modern corporate
practice. Because the demand requirement discourages direct resort to such mechanisms while providing no countervailing advantages, it is rejected as an outmoded procedural requirement.
While promoting direct resort to the special committee mechanism, the Statute responds to the threat of structural bias by
establishing a dual standard of review for the committee's recommendation. The Statute avoids the flaw of Zapata by making
each standard of review independent of the other, and avoids
the restrictiveness of the ALI formulation by mandating a moderate standard of review in the majority of cases and reserving
intensive judicial review for cases with a high probability of
structural bias.
Section 4(c)(i) of the Statute provides, in essence, that a derivative action may be dismissed solely on the recommendation
of a special committee if the committee carries the burden of
proving independence, good faith, thorough investigation, and
reasonable business justification. The intent of this provision is
to establish a level of review for most cases that is more vigorous
than Zapata's first step of analysis, while less intrusive than
Zapata'ssecond step. The level of judicial inquiry anticipated at
this stage is more than whether the committee's recommendation has a reasonable factual basis. The committee report should
be subjected to a searching judicial inquiry into its legal and factual bases, and the committee's recommendation followed only if
proven to be justified under all the circumstances. 16
165. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Business
Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401, 418 (1983).
166. The proposed standard is considerably more stringent than the first level of
analysis under Zapata, which merely requires "reasonable bases" for the committee's
recommendation. 430 A.2d at 789. As one commentator has noted:
Under the conventional reasonable basis test, directors may choose with impunity from mutually exclusive alternative courses of action as long as they have
satisfactory factual or authoritative support for the course they choose to take.

Cox, supra note 125, at 979. Under the proposed standard, the proponents of the committee recommendation must prove that it is more than plausibly supported-they must
prove that among the range of choices available under the circumstances the committee's

SPRING

1986]

Legislative Reform

Under Zapata's second level of analysis, the reviewing court is
allowed wide discretion to apply its independent judgment to
the committee's recommendation.' 6 7 Although often cited as the
most creative, and certainly the most controversial, aspect of the
decision, 6 ' Zapata's second level of analysis is more formidable
in theory than in fact. Because a second-level review is available
only in those cases that the court finds, under the first level of
analysis, are not frivolous, 69 the court is free to apply its own
judgment to a committee recommendation only when no plausible explanation supports the committee's conclusions.
Apparently reacting to the limitations inherent in the Zapata
formulation, the proposed ALI standard requires in all cases
170
that the court determine, in its own "independent judgment,
that the reasons advanced in support of the committee recommendation are not outweighed by the probable recovery to result
from the action, do not "frustrate any authoritatively established public policy" and are "advanced in good faith."'1 7 1 Although the ALI proposal is certainly a far clearer version of the
Zapata test and succeeds in preventing corporations from
"wrest[ing] bona fide derivative actions away from well-meaning
derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee mechanism," 17 2 by submitting all cases to the highest level of judicial
scrutiny it fails to address the corporation's need to expeditiously rid itself of strike suits. As commentators have noted,
"[T]he ALI proposal . . . fails because it does not provide a
173
practical alternative to litigating to death on the merits.'
The Statute attempts to strike a reasoned compromise position. Although the vast majority of cases are subject to limited
judicial scrutiny, actions that could result in the imposition of
recommendation is in the best interests of the corporation. Cf. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (burden of proving disinterestedness and
good faith is on defendants; error to apply presumption of good faith).
167. 430 A.2d at 789.
168. See, e.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 144; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22;
Cox, supra note 125; Note, supra note 22.
169. Such cases do not have "reasonable bases" for the committee's conclusion that
the suit is frivolous. 430 A.2d at 789. See also Kaplan v. Wyatt, No. 6361 (Del. Ch. Nov.
5, 1984). But see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983). The Second Circuit, while purporting to apply Zapata under Connecticut law,
ignored the "reasonable bases" aspect of the Zapata test and implied that a court should
apply its own business judgment in all cases. Id. at 891.
170. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.03(c)(ii).
171. Id.
172. 430 A.2d at 786.
173. Block, Prussin & Wachtel, supra note 165, at 416.
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personal liability1 74 on a majority of the board, or on persons
who control a majority of the board, are subject to more vigorous
review.175 In such cases, the court is empowered to apply its own
judgment to determine if the committee's conclusions "are fair
and reasonable . . . and are not overridden by a countervailing
public policy."' 78 The Statute assumes that structural bias is inherent in all decisionmaking, but that unless the action specifically calls into question the integrity of the board, the threat of
such bias is insufficient to justify a more lengthy and intrusive
7
judicial review.1
E.

Settlement and Compromise

Section 5(a) of the Statute provides that a Derivative Action
shall not be discontinued, compromised, or settled without prior
17 8
approval of the court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and many state statutes1 7 9 contain a similar requirement.
The prohibition on private settlements is intended to discourage both the filing of unmeritorious claims and strike suits commenced solely to obtain an early settlement. One commentator
has called the private settlement a "buy-off: the class plaintiff or
his lawyer is paid to drop his suit or to abandon its prosecu174. Just as it is reasonable to assume that a man will not willingly vote to pursue an
action against himself, Smith v. Spaulding, 354 U.S. 91 (1957), it is reasonable to suppose that forces of structural bias are likely to be brought to bear in such a situation to
prevent the same result through an "independent" committee.
175. Statute § 4(c)(ii).
176. Id.
177. The Second Circuit perceptively noted that structural bias is likely to infect
committee decisions relating to the potential liability of fellow directors:
The reality is. . . that special litigation committees created to evaluate the merits of certain litigation are appointed by the defendants to that litigation. It is
not cynical to expect that such committees will tend to view derivative actions
against the other directors with skepticism. Indeed, if the involved directors expected any result other than a recommendation of termination at least to them,
they would probably never establish the committee.
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
For the higher standard of review embodied in Section 4(c)(ii) to be meaningful, the
plaintiff must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and contest the
committee's conclusions. See Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp.
1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981). See also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del.
1981); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp.
817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
179. See, e.g., Mich. Bus. Corp. Act, MICH. ComP. LAWS § 450.1492 (1979); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963); N.C. Bus. Corp. Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(c)
(1982).
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tion-the class or corporation gets nothing." 180 The primary purpose of court approval of settlements is, of course, to guard the
interests of the corporation and its investors.1 81
Section 5(b) requires notice to be given to holders of Qualified
Interests whose interests the court determines will be substantially affected by a proposed settlement. One of the purposes of
notice is to ensure a full debate of the fairness of a proposed
settlement, and to provide the court access to differing views as
1 82
to such fairness.
Notice shall be given in a manner sufficient to inform the
holders of the terms of the proposed settlement, and the date,
time, and place of the settlement hearing. 18 3 Normally, notice
can be expected to take the form of a court order that informs
holders that a derivative action is pending, that a settlement has
been proposed, and that a copy of the settlement is enclosed.
The notice should indicate that holders may show cause at the
settlement hearing why such settlement should not be approved.
The notice should further inform the holders that the pleadings,
depositions, documents, and other exhibits are on file with the
court and may be inspected.18"
Section 5(c) provides that an objecting holder shall be permitted a reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery, to present evidence and testimony, and to cross-examine the witnesses for
proponents of the settlement. This provision essentially codifies
the common practice in most jurisdictions.18 5
In determining the amount of investigatory tools to be af180. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-PartII: The
Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 816 (1969).
181. See Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1953).
182. In addition, the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), implied that the right of shareholders to be heard regarding the fairness of a class
action settlement may implicate constitutional due process concerns. Id. at 173-77. At
the very least, the giving of notice increases the likelihood that a settlement will be upheld if subsequently challenged. See Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
183. Statute § 5(b).
184. The manner of giving notice is left to the discretion of the court. Id. Although
actual notice by mail is the preferred alternative, constructive notice by publication may
be appropriate under the circumstances, particularly when the magnitude of the proposed settlement is small compared to the expense of mailing individual notices. See,
e.g., Blau v. Allen, 171 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
The cost of giving notice is not specifically addressed in the Statute. Although such
expense is traditionally paid by the beneficiary corporation, Haudek, supra note 180, at
788, at times one or more of the named defendants bears the costs. See, e.g., Glicken v.
Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The preferred practice is for the cost of
notice to be an item of negotiation among the parties, and then stipulated in the proposed settlement.
185. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 335.
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forded an objecting holder, the court may consider, inter alia,
the extent of investigation requested by the objector, the complexity of the underlying issues, and the amount and relevance
of the evidence produced in support of the settlement by its proponents. In short, the court should balance the "usefulness of
the additional evidence against the burden in time and expense
1 s8
of securing and receiving it."
Although the court should consider all relevant objections in
determining the merits of a proposed settlement, it should not
automatically assume that a lack of objections is necessarily an
indication of the settlement's fairness. The Supreme Court has
noted in the class action context that silence does not relieve the
court of its duties to absent members of the class, but instead
adds to its responsibility to reach an independent and objective
judgment."' 7 Similarly, the court is charged with the responsibility of reaching an independent judgment as to the reasonableness of a derivative suit settlement. 8 Although the court's inquiry may be aided by the presentation of objectors, the absence
of such objectors is not, in itself, an indication of reasonableness.
Section 5(e) delineates some of the factors the court shall consider when determining the reasonableness of a proposed settlement. These factors include the benefit of the proposed settlement to the corporation, objections of holders of Qualified
Interests, and fees and expenses to be paid by the corporation. It
is anticipated that the court will compare the value of the
proposed settlement-including
any nonpecuniary benefitl 8 9-minus expenses, to the value of any probable recovery if
the action were litigated to a conclusion. In conducting this comparison the court must take into account expense estimates prepared by the parties, the risk attendant to continuing litigation,
and the likelihood of collecting any damage award.1 90
Finally, section 5(f) regulates the continuing effect of the settlement of a derivative action. Court approval of the settlement
gives it res judicata effect, and binds the corporation, its shareholders, and all other holders of Qualified Interests, and is sub186. Haudek, supra note 180, at 795.
187. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 435 (1968).
188. Statute § 5(d).
189. Examples of nonpecuniary benefit include the election of new directors under
court supervision, the institution of new accounting practices and the appointment of
independent auditors, and the cancellation of management claims against the corporation. See Heddendorf v. Goldfine, 167 F. Supp. 195 (D. Mass. 1958); Bysheim v. Miranda, 45 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943).
190. See Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 615 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).

SPRING 19861

Legislative Reform

ject to attack only on the basis of defective notice"9 ' or inadequate representation of class members. 9 2 This provision
essentially follows the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and
l93
modern case law.
F.

Special Rules Pertainingto Close Corporations

In publicly held corporations operating on a national or international scale, minority shareholders may feel vulnerable at the
hands of directors, majority shareholders, or management. The
derivative action is designed to give such individual shareholders
a method to protect their interest despite a lack of bargaining
power.
As impotent as the small shareholder may feel in a public corporation, comparable investors in closely held corporations live
perhaps an even more precarious existence. Like the vast majority of public corporation shareholders, close corporation minority shareholders frequently are unable to influence management
and may be denied any meaningful input into corporate affairs.
But unlike investors in public corporations with a ready market
for their securities, the victimized investor in a close corporation
can be, and nearly always is, "locked in"-that is, unable to liquidate his holdings either because there is no ready market for
his securities or because of legal" 4 or contractual 195 restrictions
that permit sale only to a limited group at a disadvantageous
price. 96
191. Statute § 5(f)(i).
192. Statute § 5(f)(ii).
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 48.1, 86 (1982). Cf. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954) (settlement accorded same preclusive effect as final judgment, provided that no collusion or fraud is shown).
194. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), prohibits the resale of unregistered securities, except under very limited circumstances. See
Securities Act of 1933, Rule 144.
195. Such restrictions often take the form of a right of first refusal, see Lawson v.
Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (1930); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,
2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812, 61 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957), or a limitation upon alienation of
shares to parties other than current shareholders. See Alexy v. Kennedy House, Inc., 507
F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Carpenter v. Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S.W. 695 (1927). But
see Greene v. E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938) (restriction
forbidding all sales except to issuer corporation invalid restraint on alienation); Stech v.
Panel Mart, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (provision for the automatic transfer of shares upon the death of the shareholder); Ginsberg v. Coating Prods., Inc., 152
Conn. 592, 210 A.2d 667 (1965) (same).
196. The dilemma of protecting minority investors in close corporations has been
summarized by the Supreme Court of California in the following way:
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The Statute recognizes that the unique position of investors in
close corporations may render derivative recovery inequitable or
ineffective. Therefore, two methods of recovery unique to close
corporations are provided: (1) discretionary characterization as a
individual pro rata recovery
direct action; and (2) 9 discretionary
7
claims.
derivative
on
Some courts have recognized that derivative actions on behalf
of closely held corporations present special considerations. The
leading case in this regard is the Ninth Circuit opinion in Watson v. Button."'s Because the corporation involved in Watson
had only two shareholders, the Ninth Circuit implied that the
policy reasons supporting a derivative characterization were inapplicable: multiplicity of actions could not result; creditors
could not be injured because both shareholders were individually liable for corporate debts; and no other shareholders could
be prejudiced by allowing a direct recovery."9 Subsequent cases
have expanded the Watson reasoning to include corporations
with many more shareholders. 0°
The Statute endorses a Watson-type recovery to be utilized in
the discretion of the court in an action brought in the right of a
close corporation, as defined in section 1(g). 2 01 If the court does
not elect to exercise such discretion, the derivative action will be
The increasingly complex transactions of the business and financial communities
demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional theories of fiduciary obligation as
tests of majority shareholder responsibility to the minority. These theories have
failed to afford adequate protection to minority shareholders. . . in closely held
corporations whose disadvantageous and often precarious position renders them
particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the majority.
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 112, 460 P.2d 464, 473, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
601 (1969).
197. Statute § 6(a), (c).
198. 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956).
199. Id. at 237.
200. See, e.g., Dresden v. Willock, 518 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1975); Kirk v. First Nat'l
Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 621 P.2d 916
(1980); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
One court aptly summarized the relevant issues Watson presented:
The substantive concerns caused by the presence of other injured former
shareholders are that a Watson-type theory of recovery would generate a multiplicity of suits and would prejudice other former shareholders by diminishing
the assets available for compensation of their injuries. However, both of these
concerns are present in any class action type situation, where less than all injured parties request relief, and relief is not denied because of concern over multiplicity and diminution of assets. . . . Consequently. . . this court can hardly
conclude that those same concerns would prompt Georgia to reject plaintiffs'
equitable theory of relief, a terribly burdensome result.
Kirk, 439 F. Supp. at 1149.
201. Statute §§ 1(g), 6(a).
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subject to the procedural requirements of sections 6(b) and
2
20

(c).

1. Section 1(g): Definition of close corporation- Before the
court may exercise its discretion to treat a derivative claim as a
direct action under section 6(a), a finding must be made that the
corporate entity involved is a Close Corporation as defined in
section 1(g). The following three-pronged test is embodied in
section 1(g)(i)-(iii). A Close Corporation: (i) has 35 or fewer record holders of its equity securities; (ii) has $3 million or less of
total assets; and (iii) has never undertaken an offering of its securities requiring registration pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, or state law.
These three factors-number of shareholders, value of assets,
and non-public character of stock-delineate as closely as possible the distinguishing characteristics of a close corporation. The
precise formulation of these factors derives from the registration
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934203 and the
private offering exemption of the Securities Act of 1933.204
States do not employ a uniform definition of a close corporation. California, for example, defines a close corporation as one
that has thirty-five or fewer stockholders and that elects to be so
classified.2 0 5 Delaware's definition is more precise because it
states that a close corporation is one with a charter that limits
the number of shareholders of all classes to a minimum of thirty
and forbids a public offering as described in the Securities Act of
1933.20 Illinois includes the requirement that all issued stock be
subject to one or more transfer restrictions,20 7 while at least four
states employ definitions based in whole or in part on the num20 8
ber of shareholders.
Definitions employed by the courts have been equally varied
and difficult to apply beyond their particular facts.2 09 Therefore,
202. The American Law Institute endorses direct treatment, in the discretion of the
court, if the corporation "is not a publicly held corporation" and the court "finds that to
do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of
actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors in the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery ....
" ALI Code, supra note 21,
§ 7.01(d).
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1985).
204. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1985).
205. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West Supp. 1985).
206. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1984).
207. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 1203(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
208. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)
(1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7202(a) (1981); ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102(5)
(1985).
209. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975).
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the Statute adopts a precise definition based on realistic business criteria, such as size and qualification under the securities
laws, to be applied strictly by the courts. A bright-line rule
based on the realistic criteria of number of shareholders, assets,
and security registration will serve the planning needs of business and the operational needs of the court.
2. Section 6(b): Contemporaneous ownership requirementSection 6(b) provides that if an action brought in the right of a
corporation described in section 1(g) is treated as a derivative
action, then provisions relating to contemporaneous ownership
will apply. Section 6(b) is not discretionary. If a derivative action is prosecuted in the right of a close corporation, a contemporaneous ownership requirement will apply.
Section 3 adopts a knowledge standard, in lieu of the traditional contemporaneous ownership requirement for all corporations other than close corporations. 2 0 The rationale underlying
section 3 is inapplicable in the context of a close corporation,
because information transfer and efficient market factors are
likely to be minimal. Accordingly, the traditional contemporaneous ownership requirement is retained for close corporations.
3. Section 6(c): Individual recovery on derivative claimsFor reasons outlined in the discussion of section 7(a),21 individual recovery on derivative claims is not permitted by the Statute
in the normal case. But because a minority investor is more
12
likely to be "locked-in" to his holdings in a close corporation,
and because controlling investors are more likely to be involved
in and benefiting from wrongdoing, the Statute embodies a provision authorizing individual pro rata recovery on derivative
claims brought in the right of a closely held corporation. 1 3
G.

Damages

1. Judgment and equitable relief- Section 7(a) directs that
judgment for plaintiff in any derivative action be paid directly to
the corporation. 1 4 Based on three factors, section 7(a) rejects by
implication the notion developed in some cases that individual
210. See supra notes 89-120 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
213. See Statute § 6(c). See also Note, Individual Pro Rata Recovery in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1956).
214. Statute § 7(a). See also Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).
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recovery should be allowed on a derivative claim.2" 5 The first
factor is that in derivative actions involving large publicly held
corporations it is practically impossible to provide adequate redress for all injured interests on a pro rata basis. Many shareholders are unlikely to know of the suit, or, knowing of it, may
rely on its derivative nature to protect their interests. Therefore,
pro rata recovery detracts from the derivative action's deterrent
effect by encouraging directors to obtain releases from other investors and to secure individual settlements from those who
threaten to sue.2" 6 Second, by awarding individual judgment in a
derivative action, the court is, in effect, forcing the distribution
of a dividend to a limited number of holders. Such a forced distribution of corporate assets should be disfavored by the law.
Finally, individual recovery may endanger creditors' interests
because, unlike corporate recovery, it wipes out the corporation's
claim without substituting or replenishing corporate assets.
This Commentary argues that the three factors outweigh the
negative effects of windfall derivative recoveries to management
wrongdoers. 1 17 On those rare occasions when management
wrongdoers may benefit from a derivative recovery, a court
should grant equitable relief pursuant to section 7(a) to promote
deterrence and prevent unjust enrichment.
Section 7(a) borrows principles from the corporate dissolution
area to illustrate that, in some cases, equitable relief is appropriate either in lieu of or in addition to money damages.2" 8 Were
the derivative action viewed as strictly compensatory in nature,
equitable relief would clearly be inappropriate. Because the derivative action should deter as well as compensate, however, 19
the court should not hesitate to award a full range of equitable
remedies. Section 7(a) is intended to suggest available remedies,
but is not exhaustive in its description of the form equitable relief may take. Some courts have held that unless monetary damages are awarded, the plaintiff is not entitled to litigation expenses and attorney's fees because the corporation does not
215. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955); Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, aff'd, 276 N.Y. 551, 12
N.E.2d 570 (1937); Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 31 A. 1058 (1895).
216. See Harris v. Rogers, 190 A.D. 208, 179 N.Y.S. 799 (1919); Hornstein, Problems
of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 574, 583-84 (1942).
217. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955) (court reasoned that direct recovery in derivative action necessary to prevent
windfall to wrongdoers).
218. Id. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984) (equitable
relief available upon involuntary dissolution of corporation).
219. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
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share in the recovery. 2 0 In many cases, however, the corporation
can directly benefit from an equitable recovery. Actions seeking
equitable relief should not be discouraged by the withholding of
expenses and fees. Section 7(a) specifically provides that if exclusively nonpecuniary relief is awarded the defendant shall be
directed to pay the reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of
the plaintiff.
2. Damage cap for Due Care Violations- If the Derivative
Action is to be an effective deterrent, damages must be assessed
against wrongdoers in amounts likely to prevent future misconduct. Courts and juries, however, might become reluctant to enforce penalties that appear disproportionate to the culpability of
the underlying behavior. This phenomenon has been well-documented in the context of criminal law, 22 1 and in the context of
private enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. 22
Because the potential liability for damages proximately caused
by the negligent action or inaction of a director of a major corporation is enormous, absent some sort of damage ceiling "the
civil liability for conduct not involving any element of scienter
or willfulness may exceed the highest authorized fine for any
criminal felony. 22 3 Potential liability in such proportions is unnecessary to promote the deterrence concept, and may produce a
counterintuitive result by discouraging qualified persons from
accepting directorships. In the worst case, courts may be
tempted to distort the law by finding grounds not to impose
crushing liability.
Therefore, the Statute places a damage cap on all Derivative
Actions based on Due Care Violations." As defined in section
1(e) and limited in section 7(b)(i), the damage cap extends only
to instances of ordinary negligence involving no self-dealing, scienter, willfulness, or personal gain.2 25
If the court determines that the action is one to which section
7(b) applies, damages must be limited to the statutory ceiling. 226
220. See, e.g., Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, aff'd, 276 N.Y.
551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937).
221. See, e.g., Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 748, 750-51 (1935).
222. See, e.g., Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a
Price Fixer Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131 (1980).
223. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 317.
224. Statute § 7(b).
225. For the damage cap to apply, no personal gain may accrue to any Associate of
any defendant as defined in section l(f). This provision is designed to prevent indirect.
benefits for negligent conduct.
226. Statute § 7(b).
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The ceiling is designed to give the court flexibility in setting
damages keyed to the financial circumstances of the individual
defendants. The rationale of the statutory ceiling is that it is
equitable to assess damages based upon fees, salary, or other
compensation paid to the defendant by the corporation, because
the defendant, having been found negligent, has failed to earn
such compensation. Defendants, however, are not necessarily
equal among themselves. Some defendants may be more culpable than others. Therefore, the court has discretion to set damages up to the defendant's aggregate net taxable income for the
five years preceding the Due Care Violation.22 7 The range of
damages allowable under the ceiling permits the court to recognize degrees of responsibility for negligent conduct, while safeguarding defendants from damage assessments out of proportion
to the blameworthiness of their conduct.
H.

Abuse of Process

When characterizing abuses peculiar to derivative actions,
commentators generally focus on abuses perpetrated by plaintiffs and their counsel, specifically, strike suits brought solely for
personal gain rather than corporate benefit.2 28 Plaintiffs and
their counsel, however, are not the only parties guilty of derivative suit abuse. Defendants and their counsel may adopt dilatory
tactics and abuse the discovery process, hoping to wear down
plaintiffs to the point of financial exhaustion. To remedy derivative suit abuses by both plaintiffs and defendants, the Statute
embodies an abuse of process provision.2 2 9 It is designed to deter
abuses by enabling the court to impose costs upon any party or
its counsel.
Section 8 differs markedly from the traditional remedy directed at derivative suit abuse. The traditional view is that such
abuses are best addressed by means of a security-for-expenses
requirement.2 30 At best, this approach discourages plaintiffs
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Dykstra, supra note 9, at 75; Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50 (1968).
229. Statute § 8.
230. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-223 (1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-4-121 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.147 (West Supp. 1984);
NES. REV. STAT. § 21-2047 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.460 (1969); W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-103 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (West 1957). Four states allow the
court discretion in determining when security is necessary. CAL. COR. CODE § 800(e)
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from bringing strike suits. It does nothing, however, to deter
plaintiffs' counsel, defendants, or defendants' counsel from derivative suit abuse once the suit is in progress. In contrast, section 8 applies to all parties and counsel, and thus more thoroughly responds to the evils of derivative suit abuse, regardless
of their origin.
Security-for-expenses requirements generally provide that the
corporation is entitled to require a plaintiff to post security for
the reasonable expenses the corporation incurs in defending the
action should plaintiff lose.2 31 These requirements are often supplemented with an exemption for plaintiffs owning shares at or
above a specified market value or percentage.23 2 The provisions
vary widely from state to state. In some jurisdictions, for example, any defendant can move for security,2 3 3 while other jurisdictions allow only the corporation to request security.' 3
Although security-for-expenses statutes have been in existence
in various forms since 1944, there is little consensus among commentators regarding their practical effects.23 5 These statutes,
however, are a minor factor in the prosecution of derivative
suits. 2 3 6 Indeed, security for expenses is not effective in deterring
strike suits, because clever plaintiffs may generally avoid the requirement by joining other plaintiffs to the cause of action to
increase the percentage or value of stock ownership so as to
qualify for an exemption. 3 7
Assuming that security for expenses is effective in preventing
or terminating frivolous actions in at least some cases, it nevertheless suffers from three insuperable problems. First, the requirement has the same problem as the contemporaneous own(West Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516 (Purdon Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-1-718 (1984); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(c) (Vernon 1980).
231. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 79, § 5971.1.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c) (West Supp. 1984).
234. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
235. Compare Bowes, Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act Be
Amended?, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 37 (1950) and Note, Security for Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique,52 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1952) (criticizing security-for-expenses statutes), with Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against
Directors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1944) (defending security-for-expenses statutes).
236. See Cox, supra note 125, at 965.
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. If the original plaintiff does not
meet the criteria for the exemption, he usually may obtain a stay after the motion is
made for security, during which he may obtain the corporation's shareholder list and
attempt to join other shareholders as plaintiffs to satisfy the ownership requirement.
Because most corporations prefer to avoid widespread access to their shareholder list
and would likely prefer to avoid the widespread publicity attendant to the solicitation
for plaintiffs, motion for security is seldom made.
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ership rule: it is overbroad. 238 Because security may be
demanded in any derivative suit, the requirement fails to distinguish between meritorious and nonmeritorious actions, and thus
tends to chill both. For example, at least one security-for-expenses provision awards the proceeds of the security bond to the
corporation whenever the plaintiff loses the derivative action,
whether or not the action was meritorious. 3 9 Thus, the security
requirement would probably deter any plaintiff not reasonably
certain of winning the derivative suit, even if such suit were
meritorious, because the plaintiff would not want to risk losing
the proceeds of the bond. Because discouragement of meritorious plaintiffs from bringing derivative actions is inconsistent
with the deterrence principle, security for expenses should be rejected on this ground alone.
The second problem is that security-for-expense provisions
are discriminatory. The statutes often exempt security holders
of large amounts of the corporation's securities from posting security yet require small security holders to post such a bond.2 40
This discriminatory aspect of the requirement is both unfair to
minority interest holders and wholly unnecessary.
The third and final problem with the security provision is that
it may penalize the wrong party. For example, plaintiff's attorney rather than plaintiff may be the person seeking a strike suit
recovery, yet the provision imposes a sanction on plaintiff alone.
This result is particularly inequitable in the case in which plaintiff in good faith believes that a meritorious claim exists based
on his attorney's representations. In sum, the obvious flaws of
the security statutes outweigh their benefits. Accordingly, the
Statute does not impose a security-for-expenses requirement. 2 1
The Statute attempts to address the concerns underlying
traditional security-for-expenses requirements by enacting sanctions for abuse of process. 242 The abuse of process provision of
the Statute is novel in that no presently enacted statutory
238. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
239. Model Business Corporation Act § 49 (1971). The revised Model Act has eliminated the security-for-expenses requirement.
240. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
241. Four states have enacted modified security-for-expenses requirements. See
supra note 230. These modified statutes provide that defendants may move for security,
but allow the court discretion in determining whether to impose it. Id. By allowing the
court discretion to impose a security requirement, these statutes solve some of the overbreadth and unfairness problems of the traditional statutes. Because the modified requirements mandate a mini-hearing to determine the merits of a security request, however, they may succeed only in burdening courts with frivolous procedural litigation.
242. Statute § 8.
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scheme attempts to prevent derivative suit abuse by means of
costs imposed directly on the offending party. 43
Section 8 grants the court discretion to award costs against a
party or its counsel 244 for abuse of process or material protraction of the litigation.2 45 The court's authority to award costs extends throughout the course of the litigation and encompasses
243. The ALI recognized the appropriateness of such a requirement in its proposed
Code of Corporate Governance. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02(e).
244. Because attorneys are subject to regulation by their profession, it can be argued
that specific sanctions against attorneys in the derivative suit context are unnecessary.
Specifically, attorneys are required to conform their conduct to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides for a system of discipline and sanctions against attorneys
who file suit merely to harass or who knowingly advance a claim that is unwarranted
under existing law. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2)
(1979). It is generally recognized, however, that "the bar has almost no ongoing regulation of attorney performance or competence ...
. [and] its disciplinary machinery for
dealing with misconduct is seriously defective." Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within
the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 203-04 (footnote
omitted).
245. Section 8 sets out two standards for court determination of whether a party or
its attorney committed an abuse of process or materially protracted the litigation. The
first, "without reasonable cause," is based on § 49 of the Model Business Corporation
Act, which allows a court to require plaintiff to pay defendants' costs if the court finds
the action was brought without reasonable cause. Section 8 expands the reach of the
MBCA reasonable cause standard, however, by applying it to any abuse of process and to
both counsel and parties. The term "reasonable cause" means a legally sufficient reason
for taking or refraining from action. Thus, a plaintiff or his attorney who brings a derivative suit in good faith but without adequate investigation may not have reasonable cause
for the action. Cf. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02 comment at 280. A determination of
reasonable cause depends upon the circumstances of the individual case, and lies largely
in the discretion of the court. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo. 1963).
The second standard, "bad faith," derives from the common law exception to the
"American rule" that each party must bear its own legal expenses. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967). According to the bad faith exception, a court has inherent power
to assess attorney's fees when the losing party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). In at least one case,
the Supreme Court has held that "'bad faith' may be found, not only in the actions that
led to-the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15
(1973). In practice, some New York courts have imposed costs against attorneys who
delay litigation. See, e.g., Kahn v. Stamp, 52 A.D.2d 748, 382 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1976); Moran v. Rynar, 39 A.D.2d 718, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
The term "bad faith" connotes affirmative ill will or the conscious doing of a wrong
because of dishonest purpose. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The bad
faith standard is necessary to encompass those situations in which a party or its attorney
may have reasonable cause in taking an action, but nonetheless willfully abuses process.
For example, requesting discovery may be an action taken with reasonable cause, but
requesting hard-to-find, superfluous material as part of the discovery may be in bad
faith. Traditionally, courts have found bad faith only when there has been a finding of
" 'unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy,' or persistent 'defiance of law.'" Brewer v. School
Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). In comparison, the
reasonable cause standard allows the court greater discretion and authority to impose
costs than does the narrower bad faith standard.
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every phase of the derivative action that entails an appearance
before the court-including final judgment, settlement, dismissal
or appeal.2 4
Section 8 has three purposes. First, it discourages both plaintiffs and their attorneys from bringing strike suits. Second, it
discourages derivative actions brought primarily to harass the
corporation's management. Finally, because "neither side has a
monopoly on virtue, 24 7 the section discourages defendants and
their counsel who may abuse legal process in an attempt to exhaust the plaintiff financially.
The court traditionally has the authority, in limited circumstances, to impose sanctions on parties and counsel for abuse of
process. Examples of such sanctions include contempt of court
and dismissal of the action.2 48 By adopting express cost sanctions for abuse of process, the Statute does not intend to preclude application of such other sanctions as the court deems appropriate. Thus, established sanctions derived from court rules
or case law2 49 should remain available to the court in addition to
the cost sanction embodied in section 8.
CONCLUSION

The drafting of a statutory proposal implicating controversial
legal concepts is, at best, a risky endeavor. Opinions differ on
virtually all of the policy decisions supporting the Statute proposed in this Article. It is doubtful, however, that a comprehensive approach to the problems posed by the derivative cause of
action could avoid facing the issues discussed herein.
So long as the means of corporate ownership and control remain separate, the need for mechanisms to enforce management
accountability will remain. The derivative action has survived a
tumultuous history as one of the principal methods of enforcing
such accountability. The challenge today is to preserve its utility
in that role while answering the needs of management. Although
it is possible that the judiciary could strike a satisfactory balance of the competing interests involved, the task is better
246. Cf. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02(e)(i)-(ii); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 22,
at 334 (providing separate sanctions during litigation and upon final judgment).
247. ALI Code, supra note 21, § 7.02 comment at 280.
248. See 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 38.83,
41.12 (2d ed. 1985); Fendler v. Westgate-Cal. Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975).
249. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
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suited to a statutory solution that clearly defines the role of the
derivative action in corporate governance.

